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THE CRIMINALIZATION OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS 
Steven Arrigg Koh* 
 
Overcriminalization has rightly generated national condemnation among 
policymakers, scholars, and practitioners alike.  And yet, such scholarship 
often assumes that the encroachment of criminal justice stops at our borders.  
This Article argues that our foreign relations are also at risk of 
overcriminalization due to overzealous prosecution, overreaching 
legislation, and presidential politicization—and that this may be particularly 
problematic when U.S. criminal justice supplants certain nonpenal U.S. 
foreign policies abroad.  This Article proposes three key reforms—
presidential distancing, prosecutorial integration, and legislative 
de-escalation—to assure a principled place for criminal justice in foreign 
relations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Contemporary criminal legal scholars paint a grim picture of 
overcriminalization.  In their view, criminal justice has relentlessly expanded 
in scope beyond its proper function, supplanting better forms of regulation.  
Two forces propel this encroachment of criminal justice:  overzealous 
prosecutors and reflexively “tough on crime” legislators.  Drug use, for 
example, is treated as a crime-control issue instead of a health issue.1  As one 
scholar has vividly noted, if each area of law were a different country, 
criminal law would be an expansionist power that is shrinking neighboring 
nations’ territories.2 
And yet this robust body of scholarship tells a largely domestic story, 
begging the question of whether criminal justice is similarly supplanting U.S. 
policy options abroad.  In other words, the question is whether and how the 
 
 1. See PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD:  POLICING BLACK MEN 71 (2017); DAVID GARLAND, 
THE CULTURE OF CONTROL:  CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 90 (2001); 
DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION:  THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 58 (2008); 
JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME:  HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 17–18 (2007); Darryl K. Brown, 
Criminal Law’s Unfortunate Triumph over Administrative Law, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 657, 
657 (2011) (“Overcriminalization is the term that captures the normative claim that 
governments create too many crimes and criminalize things that properly should not be 
crimes.”); Ellen S. Podgor, The Dichotomy Between Overcriminalization and 
Underregulation, 70 AM. U. L. REV. 1061, 1065 (2020) (“[I]n looking at overcriminalization, 
one needs to look at two separate tiers of this issue:  (1) the growing number of federal statutes 
that allow for increased prosecutions; and (2) the increased discretion provided to prosecutors 
in enforcement practices that results in heightened prosecution and incarceration.”); see also 
Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization:  From Morals and Mattress Tags to 
Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 764 (2005); Todd Haugh, Overcriminalization’s 
New Harm Paradigm, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1191, 1205 n.86 (2015); Erik Luna, The 
Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 705–06 (2005); Stephen F. Smith, 
Overcoming Overcriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 537, 542, 576 (2012). 
 2. Joshua Kleinfeld, Manifesto of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 
1367, 1372 (2017). 
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expansion of the U.S. criminal justice system—which operates through 
investigation, prosecution, and incarceration—is growing in our foreign 
relations.  And, in doing so, whether it is supplanting our foreign policy, 
which traditionally operates through six modalities:  diplomacy, cooperation 
and association agreements, trade, economic sanctions, military force, and 
the use of foreign aid.3 
To better grasp the criminalization of foreign relations, let us engage in 
two analogous thought experiments:  one traditionally domestic, the other 
extraterritorial.  First, consider the drug-related conduct mentioned earlier.  
Should domestic drug use be considered a crime or, instead, a health policy 
issue?  And should domestic drug possession be criminalized, and, if so, in 
what quantity?  And what about more harmful conduct, such as drug 
distribution and international drug trafficking?  Are those criminal concerns 
or health issues?  Such questions tease out the line between the overlapping 
regulatory regimes of criminal law and health policy, both of which bear on 
health-related conduct.4  Second, consider the same question, but compare 
the desirability of criminal prosecution alongside foreign policy, not health 
policy.  Take the example of corruption and foreign bribery.  Which is the 
best way to discourage corruption abroad:  Host a summit of world leaders 
to address the issue?  Engage in rule of law development abroad?  Provide 
economic incentives for countries to reform?  Pass criminal legislation such 
as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act5 (FCPA)?  Or, as prosecutors, zealously 
interpret the FCPA to prosecute foreign citizens and foreign companies in 
foreign countries, on the thin U.S. jurisdictional theory that the transactions 
are denominated in U.S. dollars?6  Such questions probe our intuitions 
regarding the proper normative place of criminal prosecution against other 
foreign policy tools. 
The time is ripe to pose such questions, as even a casual glance at U.S. 
headlines today raises the question of the function that criminal justice should 
play abroad and how the twin forces of overcriminalization are pressuring 
that function.  The United States is arresting Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou 
 
 3. See Clair Apodaca, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy Tool, OXFORD RSCH. 
ENCYCLOPEDIAS (Apr. 26, 2017), https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/ 
acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-332 [https://perma.cc/7YDF-
9F7Z]. 
 4. Cf. JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN:  THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION AND HOW 
TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 24–27, 119–22 (2017). 
 5. 15 U.S.C. § 77dd-1. 
 6. See Steven Arrigg Koh, Foreign Affairs Prosecutions, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 340, 388 
(2019); see also Supreme Court Questions Whether Dollar-Denominated Transactions or 
Other Financial Transactions in the U.S. Are Sufficient to Assert Jurisdiction over Foreign 
Corporations, FCPA PROFESSOR (May 8, 2018) [hereinafter FCPA PROFESSOR], 
http://fcpaprofessor.com/supreme-court-questions-whether-dollar-denominated-transactions-
financial-transactions-u-s-sufficient-assert-jurisdiction-foreign-corporations 
[https://perma.cc/EWS8-Y436] (describing how several FCPA enforcement actions have 
alleged jurisdiction because the transactions were denominated in U.S. dollars). 
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abroad,7 while at home indicting Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro,8 
Mexican Defense Minister Salvador Cienfuegos Zepeda,9 Russian hackers,10 
and Chinese nationals alleged to have stolen COVID-19 vaccine research.11  
Such cases exemplify what I have previously called “foreign affairs 
prosecutions,” or U.S. criminal cases with some nexus to a foreign country.12  
While such cases may arise due to the autonomous actions of a federal, state, 
or local prosecutorial office, they may also be the product of U.S. policy 
choices governing when and how to enforce criminal law outside of 
American borders—this Article calls this U.S. extraterritorial law 
enforcement policy “U.S. ELEP.” 
This Article argues that the criminalization of foreign relations is occurring 
and that, worryingly, our foreign relations may be on the verge of 
overcriminalization due to a rise of U.S. ELEP.  This Article contributes a 
descriptive and normative account of U.S. criminal justice within the broader 
framework of U.S. foreign relations and argues for presidential restraint in 
such cases.  This Article also marshals this transnational context to bolster 
scholarship on normative theories of criminalization.  This Article thus 
contributes to the literature at the intersection of criminal law, foreign 
relations law, and international law. 
Criminal law scholars are largely critical of all aspects of contemporary 
U.S. criminal justice, particularly policing and prisons.13  Foreign relations 
law scholars, by contrast, generally see criminal justice as a more appealing 
alternative to ad hoc prosecutions in Guantanamo Bay, drone strikes, or other 
 
 7. Julia Horowitz, Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou Arrested in Canada, Faces Extradition 
to United States, CNN (Dec. 6, 2018, 11:58 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/ 
12/05/tech/huawei-cfo-arrested-canada/index.html [https://perma.cc/Q2UB-EN8F]. 
 8. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Nicolás Maduro Moros and 14 Current and Former 
Venezuelan Officials Charged with Narco-Terrorism, Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other 
Criminal Charges (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/nicol-s-maduro-moros-
and-14-current-and-former-venezuelan-officials-charged-narco-terrorism 
[https://perma.cc/TEE9-XZNE]. 
 9. See Steven Arrigg Koh, Criminalizing Foreign Relations:  How the Biden 
Administration Can Prevent a Global Arrest Game, JUST SEC. (Dec. 18, 2020), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/73853/criminalizing-foreign-relations-how-the-biden-
administration-can-prevent-a-global-arrest-game/ [https://perma.cc/T5CX-LE5L]; see also 
Azam Ahmed, Mexico’s Former Defense Minister Is Arrested in Los Angeles, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/16/us/mexico-general-cienfuegos-
dea.html [ https://perma.cc/TBE2-6T46]. 
 10. See Dustin Volz, U.S. Charges Six Russian Intelligence Officers with Hacking, WALL 
ST. J. (Oct. 20, 2020, 8:17 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-charges-six-russian-
intelligence-officers-with-hacking-11603126931 [https://perma.cc/F6HC-EMDD]. 
 11. See Julian E. Barnes, U.S. Accuses Hackers of Trying to Steal Coronavirus Vaccine 
Data for China, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/21/us/ 
politics/china-hacking-coronavirus-vaccine.html [https://perma.cc/3WCH-8XFL]. 
 12. See Michael Farbiarz, Accuracy and Adjudication:  The Promise of Extraterritorial 
Due Process, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 625, 627–28 (2016); Koh, supra note 6. 
 13. See Allegra M. McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1613, 
1638–46 (2019).  See generally BUTLER, supra note 1; Emma Kaufman, The Prisoner Trade, 
133 HARV. L. REV. 1815 (2020). 
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use of force.14  Meanwhile, international law scholars are largely sanguine 
about the role of international criminal tribunals to promote accountability 
for widespread violations of international human rights and humanitarian 
law.15 
This Article balances the realities of criminal justice against global foreign 
policy imperatives.  In so doing, this Article describes a reality, a promise, 
and a fear.  Part I describes the reality:  we must apprehend the growth of 
U.S. ELEP in foreign relations.  Part I introduces this reality through two 
case examples and considers the risk of outbreak of a “global arrest game.”  
Part II then describes the promise:  two central characteristics—
distinctiveness and expressivism—should define the proper function of U.S. 
ELEP in foreign relations.  Part III underscores the fear:  the twin forces 
driving overcriminalization domestically—overzealous prosecution and 
legislative overreach—are also doing so extraterritorially and, thus, threaten 
the proper U.S. ELEP function.  Part III also emphasizes a third causal factor, 
specific to U.S. ELEP:  direct presidential politicization under the foreign 
affairs authority.  Finally, Part IV prescribes three reforms: presidential 
distancing, prosecutorial integration, and legislative de-escalation.  The 
former two regard the executive, clarifying the three-layered Department of 
Justice (DOJ) roles of the president, agency leadership, and the individual 
line prosecutor.  The latter addresses the remaining cause of 
overcriminalization—legislative overreach—and considers how a richer 
normative theory of criminalization could guide the political branches in the 
development of U.S. ELEP. 
Before doing so, a brief word to clarify terms.  By “foreign relations,” I 
mean all interaction between the U.S. government and foreign governments.  
“Foreign policy” is any of six modalities that the U.S. government 
traditionally deploys in foreign relations: diplomacy, cooperation and 
association agreements, trade, economic sanctions, military force, and the 
use of foreign aid (“six foreign policy modalities”).16  As noted above, U.S. 
ELEP refers to the policy governing the development and use of foreign 
affairs prosecutions.  By the “criminalization of foreign relations,” I mean 
descriptively the increasing use in foreign relations of U.S. ELEP over other 
foreign policy modalities.  And by “foreign relations overcriminalization,” I 
mean the normatively undesirable overuse of U.S. ELEP over other foreign 
policy modalities. 
 
 14. See generally Aziz Z. Huq, The President and the Detainees, 165 U. PENN. L. REV. 
499 (2017); Stephen I. Vladeck, The Case Against National Security Courts, 45 WILLIAMETTE 
L. REV. 505 (2009). 
 15. See generally DIANE ORENTLICHER, SOME KIND OF JUSTICE:  THE ICTY’S IMPACT IN 
BOSNIA AND SERBIA (2018); Harold Hongju Koh, Address, International Criminal Justice 5.0, 
38 YALE J. INT’L L. 525, 539–41 (2013); Milena Sterio, The International Criminal Court:  
Current Challenges and Prospect of Future Success, 52 CASE W. RSRV. J. INT’L L. 467, 467–
68 (2020).  But see Karen Engle, Anti-Impunity and the Turn to Criminal Law in Human 
Rights, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1069, 1070 (2015). 
 16. See Apodaca, supra note 3, at 2. 
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I.  THE REALITY:  THE RISE OF U.S. EXTRATERRITORIAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
Our foreign relations are being criminalized.17  This part lays the 
foundation for this argument by describing two case examples and then 
 
 17. The intersections between criminal justice and foreign policy are tremendously 
variegated.  The president of the United States may pressure another country’s foreign leader 
to investigate and prosecute a case. See Julian E. Barnes et al., Trump Pressed Ukraine’s 
Leader on Inquiry into Biden’s Son, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2019/09/20/us/politics/trump-whistle-blower-ukraine.html [https://perma.cc/DL4X-4FBA].  
The United States may or may not extradite a U.S. or foreign national back to a country where 
the national is alleged to have perpetrated a crime and in doing so trigger international 
controversy. See, e.g., Carol D. Leonnig et al., Giuliani Pressed Trump to Eject Muslim Cleric 




(reporting that Rudolph Giuliani urged President Trump to comply with the Turkish 
government’s requests to eject Fethullah Gülen, a permanent U.S. citizen, to stand trial in 
Turkey for allegedly plotting a 2016 coup attempt against President Recep Tayyip Erdogan); 
Kanishka Singh, U.S. Judge Orders Release of Peru Ex-President on Bail Due to Coronavirus 
Outbreak, GUARDIAN (Mar. 20, 2020, 1:04 AM), https://www.theguardian.pe.ca/news/ 
world/us-judge-orders-release-of-peru-ex-president-on-bail-due-to-coronavirus-outbreak-
427005/ [https://perma.cc/5TMW-LSHV] (discussing the pending extradition proceedings 
against Alejandro Toledo, former Peruvian president, who was arrested in California in 2019 
and faces serious corruption charges in Peru); Laurel Wamsley, Wife of U.S. Diplomat Flees 
U.K. After Fatal Car Crash, Avoiding Police Investigation, NPR (Oct. 7, 2019, 1:58 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/10/07/767925703/wife-of-u-s-diplomat-flees-u-k-after-fatal-car-
crash-avoiding-police-investigati [https://perma.cc/2JMJ-MYSX] (reporting that British 
Prime Minister Boris Johnson condemned a U.S. citizen’s use of diplomatic immunity after 
the individual, who is married to a U.S. diplomat, allegedly struck and killed a motorist with 
her car in England); Michael Wilson, How a Death at a Caribbean Resort Became an 
International Incident, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/ 
11/21/nyregion/gavin-scott-hapgood-anguilla-manslaughter.html [https://perma.cc/BWL2-
7AHY] (discussing the fallout after Scott Hapgood, a U.S. citizen, refused to attend a court 
hearing in Anguilla concerning a physical altercation between Hapgood and an Anguilla hotel 
worker that ended in the worker’s death).  The United States may be seen as pressuring a 
foreign criminal justice system to release a U.S. national detained or prosecuted abroad. See, 
e.g., Bassem Mroue, Judge in Lebanon Appeals Order to Release Lebanese-American, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 17, 2020, 1:30 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-
states/new-hampshire/articles/2020-03-17/lebanese-judge-orders-retrial-of-lebanese-
american [https://perma.cc/497S-XF4F] (describing how a military tribunal ordered the 
release of Lebanese-American, Amer Fakhoury, who had been detained in Lebanon since 
September 2019, to face charges of allegedly torturing prisoners while working for an Israeli 
militia more than ten years ago).  The United States may lead in the establishment of, or 
actively thwart the work of, international criminal tribunals. See, e.g., Nahal Toosi & Natasha 
Bertrand, Trump Authorizes Sanctions Against the International Criminal Court, POLITICO 
(June 11, 2020, 9:59 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/11/white-house-
international-criminal-court-sanctions-313070 [https://perma.cc/2LQ6-X69F].  See generally 
Koh, supra note 15, at 539–41.  U.S. political actors may or may not—in the case of Chinese 
Uighurs, Iraqi Yazidis, or Ottoman Armenians—declare certain foreign conduct a genocide. 
See Eldad Ben Aharon, Armenian Genocide:  US Recognition of Turkey’s Killing of 1.5 
Million Was Tangled Up in Decades of Geopolitics, CONVERSATION (Mar. 6, 2020, 8:01 AM), 
https://theconversation.com/armenian-genocide-us-recognition-of-turkeys-killing-of-1-5-
million-was-tangled-up-in-decades-of-geopolitics-129159 [https://perma.cc/U5QF-YYP5]; 
Agence France-Presse, US Senators Seek to Declare Uighur ‘Genocide’ by China in 
Bipartisan Push, GUARDIAN (Oct. 27, 2020, 9:04 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
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considering the overall picture of U.S. ELEP in contemporary foreign 
relations. 
A.  Two Cautionary Case Examples 
1.  Venezuela:  The Indictment of President Nicolás Maduro 
Venezuela’s government, led by President Nicolás Maduro Moros, has 
faced national unrest in the wake of extreme economic turmoil and electoral 
dysfunction over the last decade.18  In January 2019, President Donald J. 
Trump recognized opposition leader and president of the National Assembly 
of Venezuela, Juan Guaidó, as the interim president of Venezuela in the wake 
of elections that the United States declared to be illegitimate.19  In his 
statement, President Trump announced that he would “continue to use the 
full weight of United States economic and diplomatic power to press for the 
restoration of Venezuelan democracy.”20  Months later, he imposed new 
sanctions on the regime.21 
In the midst of this, U.S. ELEP emerged as another aspect of this foreign 
relations story.  In March 2020, the United States indicted President Maduro 
in New York, Washington, D.C., and Miami for conspiring with Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) to facilitate a decades-long 
narco-terrorism and international cocaine trafficking regime.22  Specifically, 
the federal indictments charged Maduro with illegally importing hundreds of 
tons of cocaine into the United States.23  Although the indictment of a 
presumed head of state is unusual, President Trump justified it on the ground 
 
2020/oct/28/us-senators-seek-to-declare-uighur-genocide-by-china-in-bipartisan-push 
[https://perma.cc/ADH5-Q43Y]; U.S. Decries ISIS ‘Genocide’ of Christians, Other Groups, 
NBC NEWS (Aug. 15, 2017, 1:10 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/u-s-decries-
islamic-state-genocide-christians-other-groups-n792866 [https://perma.cc/E8GM-97DB].  Or 
the criminal justice may constitute the foreign policy itself.  As the case of Hong Kong showed, 
President Trump ended the “special” relationship with Hong Kong—including its law 
enforcement relationship, which involved extradition—in light of Chinese encroachment on 
Hong Kong’s independent legal system. See Michael Crowley et al., Rebuking China, Trump 
Curtails Ties to Hong Kong and Severs Them with W.H.O., N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/29/us/politics/trump-hong-kong-china-WHO.html 
[https://perma.cc/KPL2-RN9Q].  While such procedural permutations vary, the overall trends 
are the same:  a globalized world in which criminal justice helps or hinders relations between 
states. 
 18. See Venezuela Crisis:  How the Political Situation Escalated, BBC NEWS (Dec. 3, 
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36319877 [https://perma.cc/GN42-
A84J]. 
 19. See Press Release, Statement Announcing United States Recognition of National 
Assembly President Juan Gerardo Guaidó Márquez as Interim President of Venezuela  
(Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-201900046/pdf/DCPD-
201900046.pdf [https://perma.cc/BZ38-VULZ]. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See Michael Crowley & Anatoly Kurmanaev, Trump Imposes New Sanctions on 
Venezuela, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/06/ 
us/politics/venezuela-embargo-sanctions.html [https://perma.cc/2WNH-GVSF]. 
 22. See Press Release, supra note 8. 
 23. See id. 
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that Maduro is “an illegitimate ruler” and “a tyrant who brutalizes his people” 
and promised that Maduro’s “grip on tyranny will be smashed and broken.”24  
Then, just months later, government officials in Cabo Verde detained Alex 
Nain Saab Morán, a Colombian businessman and key dealmaker for 
Maduro’s regime in Venezuela.25  U.S. authorities indicted Saab on money 
laundering charges, alleging that Saab had funneled more than $350 million 
to offshore accounts and disguised the transaction as a program for helping 
starving Venezuelans.26  On June 29, 2020, the United States formally 
requested the extradition of Saab, despite the fact that no extradition treaty 
exists between the United States and Cabo Verde.27 
What role is criminal justice playing here?  Some commentators believe 
that indictments were an integral part of the Trump administration’s 
“maximum pressure” campaign to cabin Maduro, a campaign that includes 
the aforementioned sanctions and political recognition of Guaidó.28  By 
contrast, others believe this case to be a natural consequence of years of 
investigation, which began during the Obama administration.29 
 
 24. William K. Rashbaum et al., Venezuelan Leader Maduro Is Charged in the U.S. with 
Drug Trafficking, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/ 
26/nyregion/venezuela-president-drug-trafficking-nicolas-maduro.html 
[https://perma.cc/2NXM-VQRY].  Despite these accusations, President Trump announced in 
June that he would consider meeting with Maduro, though he later appeared to walk back his 
comments. See Anne Gearan et al., Trump Backtracks on a Meeting with Venezuela’s Maduro 
after Chorus of Criticism, WASH. POST (June 22, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/trump-backtracks-on-a-meeting-with-venezuelas-maduro-after-chorus-of-
criticism/2020/06/22/8f25d598-b491-11ea-aca5-ebb63d27e1ff_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/JY7N-HDDC].  Maduro has disparaged the charges, accusing the United 
States and Colombia of inciting more violence in Venezuela and has taken retaliatory steps by 
seeking the extradition of Jordan Goudreau, who helped organize the failed incursion of 
Venezuela, from the United States. See Brian Ellsworth, Venezuela’s Maduro to Seek U.S. 




 25. Patricia Laya, Maduro’s U.S.-Charged Dealmaker Alex Saab Detained in Cabo 
Verde, BLOOMBERG NEWS (June 13, 2020), https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/maduro-s-u-s-
charged-dealmaker-alex-saab-detained-in-cabo-verde-1.1449942 [https://perma.cc/97UX-
QRAH]. 
 26. See Michael Smith & Ethan Bronner, U.S. Seeks Extradition of Maduro’s Alleged 
Dealmaker Alex Saab, BLOOMBERG NEWS (June 29, 2020), https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/u-
s-seeks-extradition-of-maduro-s-alleged-dealmaker-alex-saab-1.1458171 
[https://perma.cc/4TCP-B4EM]. 
 27. Id.; Cape Verde May Send Suspect to US Without Extradition Treaty, ABC NEWS 
(June 15, 2020, 9:02 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/cape-verde-send-
suspect-us-extradition-treaty-71254504 [https://perma.cc/H2M3-9MRH]. 
 28. Anthony Faiola et al., U.S. Indicts Venezuela’s Maduro on Narcoterrorism Charges, 




 29. It is certainly plausible that U.S. officials are correct when they state that the timing 
and nature of the charges (namely, narcoterrorism, corruption, and drug trafficking) had more 
to do with the DOJ’s investigations—specifically, the timing of grand juries weighing the 
matter in New York and Florida—than any change of position within the administration.  
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2.  China:  The China Initiative and Case of Meng Wanzhou 
The twenty-first century geopolitical dynamic between the United States 
and China presents another helpful illustration of foreign relations 
criminalization.  Over the last one hundred years, geopolitics evolved from a 
multipolar world to—in the wake of the Cold War—an era of American 
global hegemony.30  Now, China’s rise ensures that the twenty-first century 
will be a largely bipolar world, balanced between the world’s two largest 
economies.31  The U.S. government thus manages this critical relationship 
by deploying all six foreign policy modalities, each heavily discussed in 
popular and academic commentary.32  In particular, the Trump 
administration leaned more heavily on trade tariffs to manage the relationship 
between the United States and China.33 
However, in recent years, an additional force has emerged in U.S.-China 
relations:  criminal justice.  In 2018, under Attorney General Jeff Sessions, 
the DOJ launched a “China Initiative,” designed to “reflect[] the strategic 
priority of countering Chinese national security threats and reinforce[] the 
President’s overall national security strategy.”34  The head of the DOJ 
National Security Division spearheads this group, which is also run by 
various U.S. Attorneys around the country.35  The multifaceted initiative 
emphasizes trade secret theft cases and involves proactive information 
sharing and threat identification with individual U.S. Attorneys offices.36  
Since 2018, there have been eighty-four prosecutions.37 
To illustrate the function of U.S. ELEP in U.S.-China relations, consider 
the ongoing criminal case of Meng Wanzhou, the CFO of the Chinese 
telecommunications technology company Huawei.38  The press has 
described the Meng case as an “earthquake moment in US-China ties” and 
 
Federal criminal investigations, especially large cross-border investigations, take many years 
to develop; thus, the investigations could have begun during the Obama administration.  For 
example, the charges in this case were “‘a decade’ in the making.” Id. 
 30. See The Chinese Century Is Well Under Way, ECONOMIST (Oct. 27, 2018), 
https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/10/27/the-chinese-century-is-well-under-
way [https://perma.cc/S2GG-69FS]. 
 31. See id. 
 32. See generally HENRY KISSINGER, ON CHINA (2011); THOMAS J. WRIGHT, ALL 
MEASURES SHORT OF WAR:  THE CONTEST FOR THE 21ST CENTURY AND THE FUTURE OF 
AMERICAN POWER (2017). 
 33. See Ana Swanson & Alan Rappeport, Trump Signs China Trade Deal, Putting 
Economic Conflict on Pause, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/ 
01/15/business/economy/china-trade-deal.html [https://perma.cc/H2ZX-YS6M]. 
 34. See Information About the Department of Justice’s China Initiative and a Compilation 
of China-Related Prosecutions Since 2018, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (June 14, 2021), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/information-about-department-justice-s-china-initiative-and-
compilation-china-related [https://perma.cc/46KD-J582]. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Ian Young, Canadian Ruling That Could Set Huawei’s Meng Wanzhou Free Is 
Complicated by Coronavirus Pandemic, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Apr. 27, 2020, 11:09 PM), 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3081820/canadian-ruling-could-set-
huawei-executive-meng-wanzhou-free [https://perma.cc/7P8P-FHDN]. 
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one sending “Canada’s relationship with Beijing plummeting to new 
depths.”39  In particular, the Meng case has added greater fuel to the fire of 
the yearslong U.S. pressure campaign on Huawei and its 5G network.  
Huawei’s 5G network is widely seen as the next chapter in mobile 
technology—one that forecasters expect China to lead and that President 
Trump aimed to curtail globally during his presidency.40 
First, the Meng case exemplifies lawful domestic U.S. law enforcement 
investigation and indictment.  On January 28, 2019, the U.S. Attorney for the 
Eastern District of New York indicted Meng on fraud charges related to 
violation of U.S. sanctions against Iran.41  The indictment charged that Meng 
and other Huawei employees misrepresented Huawei’s relationship with 
Skycom—an Iranian subsidiary—and falsely claimed that Huawei had only 
limited operations in Iran.42  In late 2018, the United States then proceeded 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. America Does Not Want China to Dominate 5G Mobile Networks, ECONOMIST (Apr. 
8, 2020), https://www.economist.com/business/2020/04/08/america-does-not-want-china-to-
dominate-5g-mobile-networks [https://perma.cc/APF7-EVJZ].  In 2012, Congress issued a 
report that warned of Huawei’s relationship with the Chinese Communist Party and provided 
“credible evidence” that the company failed to comply with U.S. laws.  
See MIKE ROGERS & DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, INVESTIGATIVE REPORT ON THE U.S. NATIONAL 
SECURITY ISSUES POSED BY CHINESE TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPANIES HUAWEI AND ZTE:  A 
REPORT at 12 (2012), https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:rm226yb7473/Huawei-
ZTE%20Investigative%20Report%20(FINAL).pdf [https://perma.cc/H7BW-G52K].  Then, 
in 2018, the Pentagon banned sales of Huawei phones on U.S. military bases. Stu Woo & 
Gordon Lubold, Pentagon Orders Stores on Military Bases to Remove Huawei, ZTE Phones, 
WALL ST. J. (May 2, 2018, 8:16 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/pentagon-asking-
military-bases-to-remove-huawei-zte-phones-1525262076 [https://perma.cc/4BAD-Z46B]. 
 41. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Chinese Telecommunications Conglomerate 
Huawei and Huawei CFO Wanzhou Meng Charged with Financial Fraud (Jan. 28, 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-telecommunications-conglomerate-huawei-and-
huawei-cfo-wanzhou-meng-charged-financial [https://perma.cc/KKH3-GPUL].  The United 
States codified bank fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, and obstruction of justice as crimes 
in 1984, 1952, 1986, and 1982, respectively. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343–1344, 1956, 1512(c).  
Further, in 1977, the United States passed the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 
which empowers the president to address unusual and extraordinary threats to the national 
security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States. See 50 U.S.C. § 170l(a). 
 42. See Superseding Indictment at 5–8, United States v. Huawei Tech. Co., No. 18-cr-457 
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2019).  According to the indictment, Huawei represented to both its global 
banking partners and U.S. officials that it had sold its interests in Skycom in 2007 and that 
Skycom was merely Huawei’s local Iranian business partner. Id.  Instead, Huawei allegedly 
controlled Skycom, and Meng sat on its board of directors. Id.  The indictment further alleged 
that Meng and other Huawei representatives attempted to obstruct the U.S. government’s 
investigation by destroying and concealing evidence and by relocating several U.S.-based 
Huawei employees with knowledge of the company’s Iranian operations to China. Id. 
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to request that Canada arrest Meng in Vancouver, where she resided at the 
time.43  Meng’s formal extradition proceedings began in January 2020.44 
Second, the Meng case sparked condemnation from the Chinese 
government, leading to retaliatory prosecutorial and foreign policy measures.  
In response to the indictment, Hua Chunying, a spokeswoman for the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, called the 
charges “a serious mistake” and “urge[d] the U.S. to immediately correct its 
mistake.”45  Meanwhile, Canada maintained that its courts “would make 
decisions based purely on legal considerations and not on politics.”46  China 
responded by punishing Canada, and not the United States, by arresting two 
Canadians:  Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor.47  In December 2018, 
 
 43. See Jacqueline Thomsen & Olivia Beavers, US Files Criminal Charges Against 
Chinese Firm Huawei, HILL (Jan. 28, 2019, 4:46 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/ 
cybersecurity/427325-us-announces-criminal-charges-against-chinas-huawei 
[https://perma.cc/TUE9-H835].  At some point prior to Meng’s arrest, the United States 
requested that Canada provisionally arrest Meng. See Press Release, supra note 41.  In doing 
so, U.S. officials provided required information—such as a description of the person sought 
and a statement of the existence of a warrant—under the U.S.-Canada extradition treaty in 
cases of emergency. See Treaty on Extradition Between the Government of Canada and the 
Government of the United States of America, Can.-U.S., art. 11, Dec. 3, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 983.  
In 1971, the United States entered into its first bilateral treaty with Canada; the most recent 
Canada-U.S. extradition treaty entered into force in 2003. 18 U.S.C. § 3181 at 205; Treaty on 
Extradition Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of 
America, supra; Second Protocol Amending the Treaty on Extradition, Can.-U.S., Jan. 12, 
2001, T.I.A.S. No. 107-11.  In December 2018, Canadian law enforcement arrested Meng. See 
In a Row Between China and America, Canada Gets Trampled, ECONOMIST (Dec. 22, 2018), 
https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2018/12/22/in-a-row-between-china-and-america-
canada-gets-trampled [https://perma.cc/Y3EL-JCHD] [hereinafter In a Row Between China 
and America].  In late January 2019, the United States formally requested Meng’s extradition 
from Canada, within forty-five days, as required by the Canada-U.S. extradition treaty. See 
Michael Burke, US Formally Requests Extradition of Huawei Executive from Canada, HILL 
(Jan. 29, 2019, 6:55 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/427564-us-formally-requests-
extradition-of-huawei-executive-from-canada [https://perma.cc/MC3N-WHMT]; Treaty on 
Extradition Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of 
America, supra, art. 9–11 (listing the requirements for a full extradition request, including a 
description of the person sought, a statement of the facts of the case, the text of the relevant 
laws, and an arrest warrant).  Further, in late January 2019, two separate grand juries in the 
United States returned indictments against Huawei affiliates, subsidiaries, and executives.  
Thomsen & Beavers, supra. 
 44. Ian Young, Huawei’s Meng Wanzhou Back in Canadian Court for First Time Since 
Reports About Talks to Let Her Go Home to China, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Dec. 8, 2020, 
2:34 AM), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3112949/huaweis-meng-
wanzhou-back-canadian-court-first-time-reports [https://perma.cc/T3YM-27WH].  On 
December 8, 2020, Meng appeared in Canadian court for the first time in months to hear 
testimony from witnesses involved in her arrest back in 2018. Id. 
 45. Edward Wong et al., U.S. Will Ask Canada to Extradite Huawei Executive, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/22/us/politics/meng-wanzhou-
extradition.html [https://perma.cc/YS9S-6AGT]. 
 46. Id.  Canadian foreign minister Chrystia Freeland “stressed [this] approach after Mr. 
Trump told Reuters in an interview in December that he could stop the extradition of Ms. 
Meng if China offered sufficient concessions in continuing negotiations aimed at ending a 
costly trade war between the United States and China.” Id. 
 47. Id.  Such retaliatory arrest has occurred at least once before. See Dan Levin, Couple 
Held in China Are Free, but ‘Even Now We Live Under a Cloud,’ N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2017), 
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China arrested Kovrig, a diplomat, and Spavor, a Canadian businessman, 
citing national security concerns, and China is currently detaining the two 
under harsh living conditions.48  Then, just days later, a Chinese court 
sentenced a Canadian, Robert Lloyd Schellenberg, to death in an unrelated 
drug smuggling case.49  The sentence came after a one-day retrial on drug 
smuggling charges.50  Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau reacted by 
declaring that China had “arbitrarily appl[ied the] death penalty.”51  The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China denied that the 
arrests of Kovrig or Spavor, or Schellenberg’s sentencing, were related to 
Meng’s arrest.52  As this process unfolded, so did the mutual public 
recriminations between Canada and China.  Prime Minister Trudeau asked 
for the resignation of John McCallum, the Canadian ambassador to China, 
on January 27, 2019, after McCallum expressed his belief that it would be 
“great for Canada” if the United States dropped its extradition request.53  
Furthermore, in response to Meng Wanzhou’s arrest, China described the 
charges against Meng as “politically motivated.”54  The Meng case was 
complicated by repeated assertions then-President Trump made that 
“criminal charges against Chinese telecom giant Huawei and [Meng] could 




 48. Javier C. Hernández & Dan Bilefsky, For Canadians Held in China, Two Years of 
Isolation and Uncertainty, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/ 
12/09/world/asia/china-canada-michael-kovrig-spavor.html [https://perma.cc/77QS-K35U]; 
see also In a Row Between China and America, supra note 43 (“According to a person familiar 
with the situation, Mr. Kovrig is being questioned ‘morning, afternoon and evening’ and is 
not allowed to turn the lights off when he sleeps.”).  As will be discussed further in Part II, 
then-President Trump further politicized the arrest, saying that he “would intervene in the 
Meng case if . . . ‘it’s good for the country,’” specifically referring to a potential trade deal 
with China. Interactive Timeline:  The Extradition Case of Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou, BUS. 
IN VANCOUVER (Apr. 13, 2020, 1:19 PM), https://biv.com/article/2020/ 
04/interactive-timeline-extradition-case-huawei-cfo-meng-wanzhou [https://perma.cc/5LRB-
H4RV]. 
 49. Chris Buckley, China Sentences a Canadian, Robert Lloyd Schellenberg, to Death, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/world/asia/china-canada-
schellenberg-retrial.html [https://perma.cc/LBF6-VS66]. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id.  Canada intends to intercede in the case as the decision is pending examination and 
ratification by China’s highest court. Id. 
 53. Trudeau Fires Canada’s Ambassador to China amid Huawei Controversy,  
BBC NEWS (Jan. 27, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-47015700 
[https://perma.cc/E6KR-BB22].  Prime Minister Trudeau’s comments followed his earlier 
remarks “that Meng had some ‘strong arguments’ for avoiding extradition to the US and that 
Meng’s extradition ‘would not be a happy outcome.’” Isobel Asher Hamilton, Canada Fired 
Its Chinese Ambassador After His ‘Mind-Boggling’ Remarks on the Arrest of Huawei’s CFO, 
BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 28, 2019, 6:27 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/justin-trudeau-
fired-china-ambassador-over-comments-about-meng-wanzhou-2019-1 
[https://perma.cc/7XEZ-7Z7W]. 
 54. See Hamilton, supra note 53. 
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negotiations with China,”55 contravening warnings from his staff about the 
ramifications of politicizing the case.56  Meanwhile, academics, diplomats, 
and policymakers have been deeply critical of China’s behavior in these 
cases.  In late January 2019, over one hundred such individuals signed an 
open letter calling for the release of Kovrig and Spavor.57  In June 2020, 
China indicted the two on espionage charges; in August 2021, Spavor was 
convicted and sentenced to eleven years in prison.58  Finally, just before 
publication of this Article, DOJ announced that it had entered into a deferred 
prosecution with Meng in which she admitted to engaging in the alleged 
fraudulent misrepresentations.  This event sent into effect a rapid chain of 
de-escalation in September 2021:  the United States agreed to withdraw its 
extradition request from Canada; Meng returned to China; and China 
returned Spavor and Kovrig to Canada, where they were personally greeted 
at the airport by Prime Minister Trudeau.59 
Third, and finally, while the acute multilateral tension of the Meng case 
has subsided, its aftershocks are now folded into the broader, complex 
foreign relations between the United States, China, and Canada.  Canadian 
unfavorable perceptions of China are near historic highs, influenced in part 
by the Meng events and also by COVID-19.60  Meanwhile, Chinese state 
media barely covered the release of Spavor and Kovrig, leaving the 
impression on the Chinese public that Beijing gave nothing away for their 
 
 55. Steven Overly, Trump Says Huawei Charges on the Table in China Trade Talks, 
POLITICO (Feb. 22, 2019, 6:43 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/02/22/trump-
huawei-china-trade-talks-1206627 [https://perma.cc/69DG-WY5P].  Meng’s lawyers have 
recently used such arguments in Canadian court to challenge her extraditability. See Ian 
Young, Huawei Executive’s Extradition Is No “Garden-Variety” Case Because of Donald 
Trump, Her Lawyer Says, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Oct. 1, 2020, 12:11 AM), 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3103763/huawei-executives-extradition-
no-garden-variety-case-because [https://perma.cc/V8L5-KFKV]. 
 56. See Horowitz, supra note 7. 
 57. Mr. Xi, Release These Two Canadian Citizens, GLOBE & MAIL (Jan. 21, 2019), 
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-mr-xi-release-these-two-canadian-
citizens/ [https://perma.cc/2PWL-QBXX].  The signatories claimed China’s retaliatory 
detentions would have a chilling effect on the flow of ideas with Chinese academics and 
officials. Id.  The letter was signed by two former American ambassadors to Beijing, as well 
as six former Canadian ambassadors to Beijing, among others. Id. 
 58. Javier C. Hernández & Catherine Porter, China Indicts 2 Canadians on Spying 
Charges, Escalating Dispute, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/ 
19/world/asia/china-canada-kovrig-spavor.html [https://perma.cc/3YKL-AVFE]; Suranjana 
Tewari, Michael Spavor:  Canadian Jailed for 11 Years in China on Spying Charges, BBC 
(Aug. 11, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-58168587 [https://perma.cc/ 
4CSG-RA5E]. 
 59. David E. Sanger et al., U.S. Agrees to Release Huawei Executive in Case That Strained 
Ties with China, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/ 
24/us/politics/huawei-meng-wanzhou.html [https://perma.cc/KDH6-PUQE]; Aruna 
Viswanatha et al., Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou Reaches Deal with Justice Department, 
WALL. ST. J. (Sept. 25, 2021, 7:15 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-department-
reaches-deal-with-huawei-executive-11632494001 [https://perma.cc/G4CY-V5GW]. 
 60. Laura Silver, Large Majorities Say China Does Not Respect the Personal Freedoms 
of Its People, PEW. RSCH. CTR. (June 30, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/global/ 
2021/06/30/large-majorities-say-china-does-not-respect-the-personal-freedoms-of-its-
people/ [https://perma.cc/5QAA-3D3M]. 
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release.61  And in America, the China Initiative is ongoing, thus aggravating 
bilateral relations.  The most recent development in the China Initiative was 
the arrest of multiple Chinese scholars in the United States.  In August 2020, 
Chinese researcher Juan Tang pled not guilty after being indicted in the 
Northern District of California on visa fraud charges; the case is one of 
twenty-five in which Chinese researchers in the United States are alleged to 
have ties to the Chinese military.62  In response to such DOJ prosecutions of 
Chinese military-affiliated scholars, in October 2020, China warned that it 
may begin detaining U.S. nationals in China.63  Just a month earlier, the U.S. 
Department of State (“State Department”) issued a travel advisory 
recommending that Americans avoid visiting China in part because the 
Chinese government detains foreign nationals “to gain bargaining leverage 
over foreign governments.”64  In January 2021, a joint letter signed by 
groups, including the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University 
School of Law, called for the Biden administration to end the China 
Initiative.65 
The Meng case and China Initiative present similar questions as those 
presented by the Maduro case:  How did this case come about?  What role 
should criminal justice play in U.S.-China relations and in U.S. foreign 
relations more generally?  To what degree is the White House directing U.S. 
ELEP and individual foreign affairs prosecutions,66 and is that problematic?  
How are prosecutors and legislators fostering this criminalization?  This 
Article will address these questions in turn. 
 
 61. Chris Buckley & Katie Brenner, To Get Back Arrested Executive, China Uses a 
Hardball Tactic:  Seizing Foreigners, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2021/09/25/world/asia/meng-wanzhou-china.html [https://perma.cc/4R6W-9YNC]. 
 62. See, e.g., Clare Roth, Chinese Researcher Who Hid in U.S. Consulate Pleads Not 
Guilty, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 10, 2020, 5:36 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2020-08-10/chinese-researcher-who-hid-in-u-s-consulate-pleads-not-guilty 
[https://perma.cc/35JT-SXB7]. 
 63. Kate O’Keeffe & Aruna Viswanatha, China Warns U.S. It May Detain Americans in 
Response to Prosecutions of Chinese Scholars, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 17, 2020, 3:37 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-warns-u-s-it-may-detain-americans-in-response-to-
prosecutions-of-chinese-scholars-11602960959 [https://perma.cc/84N6-N6AY]. 
 64. David Shepardson & Andrea Shalal, China Warns U.S. It May Detain Americans Over 
Prosecutions: WSJ, REUTERS (Oct. 17, 2020, 6:24 PM), https://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-usa-china/china-warns-u-s-it-may-detain-americans-over-prosecutions-wsj-
idUSKBN2720XL [https://perma.cc/4YWN-2SU7]. 
 65. Elizabeth Redden, Groups Call on Biden to End DOJ ‘China Initiative,’ INSIDE 
HIGHER ED (Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2021/01/06/groups-
call-biden-end-doj-‘china-initiative’ [https://perma.cc/498N-A8XA]. 
 66. This Article uses “White House” and “president” interchangeably.  Both mean the 
Office of the President itself, as opposed to other parts of the executive branch—especially 
the DOJ.  As will be discussed, there is a well-known debate as to how “unitary” the executive 
branch is and should be. See infra note 199 and accompanying text.  For present purposes, as 
a descriptive matter, this Article distinguishes between the White House and the DOJ 
regarding their knowledge of criminal cases and decision-making regarding such cases. 
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B.  The Setting and Stakes of U.S. Extraterritorial Law Enforcement 
The Maduro and Meng cases exemplify the rise of contemporary U.S. 
ELEP in our foreign relations.  Such rise risks the outbreak of a global arrest 
game. 
1.  Criminal Justice in Foreign Relations 
As I have demonstrated previously, while it is difficult to precisely 
quantify, foreign affairs prosecutions have risen dramatically in recent 
decades.67  In previous eras, for example, criminal investigations across 
borders were slow due to the snail-like pace of letters rogatory; today, it is 
hastened by the post-1970s advent of mutual legal assistance and the 
post-2018 creation of rapid electronic information sharing.68  Similarly, 
whereas arrest and extradition of fugitives used to be slower and more time 
consuming, today it is hastened by the global INTERPOL Red Notice 
system, which creates a global network of apprehension for individuals who 
 
 67. While no scholar has ever undertaken a systematic historical study of the intersection 
between criminal justice and foreign policy, the two have long made for uneasy bedfellows.  
The Framers had relatively little to say about the substance or role of the federal government 
in criminal justice or foreign relations matters, but prosecution has complicated foreign 
relations since even before our nation’s founding and, certainly, since that time. Compare 
RICHMAN ET AL., DEFINING FEDERAL CRIMES 23 (2d ed. 2018) (“While the Bill of Rights gave 
considerable attention to the procedural safeguards that would apply in federal prosecutions, 
the range of prosecutions envisioned was thus quite small, and few were brought.”), with 
CURTIS A. BRADLEY ET AL., FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW:  CASES AND MATERIALS 22 (7th ed. 
2020) (noting that “constitutional text” may be “silent about the locus of a foreign relations 
power”), and HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION:  SHARING 
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 67 (1990) (“One cannot read the Constitution 
without being struck by its astonishing brevity regarding the allocation of foreign affairs 
authority among the branches.”).  For example, the 1770 Boston Massacre trials of British 
soldiers were a lightning rod for revolutionary sentiment just before the American Revolution, 
while the Amistad trials in the 1840s engulfed the United States, Portugal, Britain, and Spain 
in contentious debates about the international slave trade. See generally DAN ABRAMS & 
DAVID FISHER, JOHN ADAMS UNDER FIRE:  THE FOUNDING FATHER’S FIGHT FOR JUSTICE IN THE 
BOSTON MASSACRE MURDER TRIAL (2020); Amistad Case, HIST. (Sept. 23, 2019), 
https://www.history.com/topics/abolitionist-movement/amistad-case [https://perma.cc/8SN3-
ELM2].  The twentieth century abounded with examples as well, particularly involving 
espionage cases during World War I, World War II, and the Cold War.  These espionage cases 
included the prosecution of eight Nazi saboteurs in 1942, the Julius and Ethel Rosenberg 
espionage trial at the height of McCarthyism in 1951, and the Imelda Marcos trial in 1988. 
See, e.g., Black Tom 1916 Bombing, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/black-tom-1916-bombing 
[https://perma.cc/VE8R-785C] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021) (describing how German agents 
destroyed two million tons of war materials in a bid to prevent U.S. shippers from supplying 
English forces, thereby provoking the United States to declare war on Germany).  Following 
the Black Tom Bombing of 1916, Congress passed the Espionage Act, which outlawed 
numerous crimes associated with German agents. Id. 
 68. See Peter Swire & Justin D. Hemmings, Mutual Legal Assistance in an Era of 
Globalized Communications:  The Analogy to the Visa Waiver Program, 71 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 687, 691–703 (2016); see also Steven Arrigg Koh, Core Criminal Procedure, 
105 MINN. L. REV. 251, 268–70 (2020) (reviewing the CLOUD Act legislation and 
considering its potential for cross-border criminal procedure). 
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themselves are readily traveling via airplane.69  This trend is generalizable 
across many facets of U.S. criminal justice today.  Since the 1970s, a growing 
transnational system of statutes, bilateral and multilateral treaties, and 
institutional capacity has facilitated cooperation between countries with 
mutual interest in enforcing their criminal laws.70  Legislatively, the United 
States has, with each successive decade, passed more federal statutes 
proscribing extraterritorial conduct and, recently, extraterritorial 
amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.71  And the DOJ has 
otherwise built out its international and national security infrastructure.  In 
particular, post-9/11, U.S. law enforcement agencies have pushed toward 
global investigation, including strengthening the presence abroad of federal 
law enforcement “attachés”—agents embedded in U.S. embassies abroad 
who are tasked with advancing the law enforcement mandates of their 
respective agencies.72  The sum total of such changes means that our foreign 
relations have become more criminalized; in other words, criminal justice 
 
 69. See Red Notices, INTERPOL, https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-
work/Notices/Red-Notices [https://perma.cc/YHN7-36RY] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021). 
 70. For example, Kevin Davis has described the OECD Paradigm of regulating 
transnational bribery as one wherein “every little bit helps.” KEVIN E. DAVIS, BETWEEN 
IMPUNITY AND IMPERIALISM 5 (2019).  Critical questions defining regulation regard:  (1) the 
targeted conduct, (2) the complicit actors, (3) the sanctions imposed, and (4) the benefits and 
burdens of imposing such sanctions. See id. at 5–6, 43–44 (describing the patchwork of 
multilateral treaties and regional enforcement mechanisms that regulate corruption).  While 
the system is not perfect—in particular, with some inevitable risk to defendant interests and 
foreign policy—it provides accountability for serious crimes by providing a lawful basis for 
investigation, apprehension, and prosecution of individuals in cases with some nexus to a 
foreign country. See generally Koh, supra note 6, at 352–53. 
 71. Koh, supra note 6, at 359.  Such changes often occur after the DOJ has called for 
them. Id. 
 72. The growth in federal law enforcement abroad began in earnest in the 1970s, in 
response to issues like the development of the transnational drug trade in the 1960s and 1970s. 
KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?:  THE EVOLUTION OF 
TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 158–61 (2009).  By 1995, about 1600 law enforcement 
personnel were operating abroad. Id. at 161.  Though the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
has had an international presence since World War II, the 1990s witnessed a true globalization 
of the FBI:  between 1993 and 2001, the FBI’s offices in U.S. embassies abroad doubled, with 
offices opening in locations such as Pakistan, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Turkey, South Korea, and 
Saudi Arabia. International Operations, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
https://www.fbi.gov/about/leadership-and-structure/international-operations 
[https://perma.cc/5JY4-9QC7] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021).  Currently, the FBI has more than 
250 special agents and other staff in over sixty overseas offices. Id.  The core mission of these 
attachés includes the advancement of international FBI investigations through established 
liaison and exchange of information with foreign law enforcement and intelligence and 
security services. See Thomas V. Fuentes, Statement Before the Subcommittee on Border, 
Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism House Homeland Security Committee, FED. BUREAU 
OF INVESTIGATION (Oct. 4, 2007), https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/the-fbi2019s-legal-
attache-program [https://perma.cc/6L8X-YS8X]; FBI Information Sharing and Safeguarding 
Report 2012, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/stats-
services/publications/national-information-sharing-strategy-1/fbi-information-sharing-and-
safeguarding-report-2012-2 [https://perma.cc/SC4W-YJR9] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021).  FBI 
attachés’ duties include coordinating requests for FBI or host country assistance overseas, 
conducting investigations in coordination with the host government, and sharing investigative 
leads and information. See Fuentes, supra. 
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presents itself as a modality of U.S. global power in a way previously 
unavailable, by historical standards.  This growth of foreign affairs 
prosecutions capability has given rise to the prospect of U.S. ELEP as a 
foreign relations tool.  In other words, along with the six foreign policy 
modalities, the United States can invoke a seventh:  its extraterritorial 
criminal authority. 
The criminalization of foreign relations creates a precarious dynamic for 
contemporary U.S. law enforcement and, thus, a need for greater scholarly 
attention on how U.S. ELEP functions in our foreign relations.  Until now, 
scholars exploring the various substantive aspects of this phenomenon have 
considered the fight against corruption through the FCPA,73 prosecution of 
foreign corporations,74 and the prosecution of banks.75  Others have 
considered procedural aspects, such as the contours of personal jurisdiction76 
or the applicability of criminal procedural rights.77  And scholarship on 
foreign affairs prosecutions has focused largely on the individual case, 
particularly on defendant rights and on how such cases differ procedurally 
from traditional U.S. criminal cases.78 
This Article builds on this scholarship in three ways.  First, it more 
explicitly links U.S. ELEP to domestic criminalization and crime control.  
Second, it shifts the analysis from an exclusively criminal legal posture to 
contextualizing U.S. ELEP as an alternative mode of U.S. global power and 
one that is potentially supplanting foreign policy.79  Previous scholarship on 
foreign affairs prosecutions has focused primarily on issues within the United 
States, such as judicial deference, only lightly touching on the rich global 
question of whether the United States “might . . . be ‘criminalizing’ foreign 
policy,” and the function such cases may play in U.S. foreign relations.80  
Finally, this Article ties together various scholarship with a more discrete 
focus, addressing one substantive offense (e.g., FCPA), one category of 
 
 73. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 70, at 37–38. 
 74. See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL:  HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE 
WITH CORPORATIONS 218–49 (2016) (reviewing prosecution of foreign corporations). 
 75. See, e.g., PIERRE-HUGUES VERDIER, GLOBAL BANKS ON TRIAL:  U.S. PROSECUTIONS 
AND THE REMAKING OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 2 (2020). 
 76. See, e.g., Farbiarz, supra note 12, at 627. 
 77. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 68, at 257. 
 78. See generally Farbiarz, supra note 12; Koh, supra note 6. 
 79. At the international level, some worry about the criminalization of transitional justice 
and human rights. See, e.g., Engle, supra note 15, at 1119–27 (questioning the criminal turn 
in the human rights movement). 
 80. See Koh, supra note 6, at 391.  Previously, I briefly considered the foreign policy 
implications of foreign affairs prosecutions. See id.  For a brief discussion of the policy 
implications of U.S. criminal cases with a foreign nexus, see id. at 385–90 (considering 
domestic criminal cases and asking how the U.S. criminal justice system is becoming more 
internationalized).  This Article, by contrast, takes a global approach, asking how the entire 
network of U.S. ELEP squares with the U.S. administration of foreign relations, the distinctive 
and expressive function U.S. ELEP plays in such broader policy, and how politicization and 
overcriminalization threaten such function. 
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defendant (e.g., banks), or one aspect of transnational criminal legal process 
(e.g., jurisdiction).81 
Cumulatively, then, the broad paradigm of extraterritorial policing and 
regulation in the postwar era constitutes an “overlooked” aspect of American 
global power.82  In particular, commentators have systematically addressed 
neither the normative question—what role U.S. ELEP should play abroad 
given the other foreign policy options of U.S. global power—nor the causal 
question—what forces propel the expansion of U.S. ELEP in U.S. foreign 
relations?  This Article answers both questions in Parts II and III. 
2.  The Global Arrest Game 
What are the stakes of foreign relations criminalization?  The central 
specter is the possibility of a global arrest game, in which countries 
worldwide engage in retaliatory arrest and/or extrajudicial killing.  Indeed, 
countries are often intertwined with their domestic corporations and 
nationals, leading to various collateral consequences when U.S. criminal 
justice impacts one or both.83  The global arrest game is particularly a risk 
given that the United States is currently at the forefront of extraterritorial 
investigation and prosecution84—it remains to be seen how and whether 
other countries will develop in this regard. 
At the same time, such countries may also engage in one or more of the 
six foreign policy modalities.  Turkey is a helpful example here.  While 
Turkey is party to a bilateral extradition treaty with the United States,85 the 
United States turned down requests for the extradition of Fetullah Gülen—
the Turkish cleric residing in Pennsylvania who allegedly orchestrated the 
failed 2016 Turkish coup attempt—on the ground that the Turkish 
government had failed to present evidence supported by probable cause that 
Gülen orchestrated the attacks.86  The Turkish government then explored 
with Michael Flynn and, likely, Rudolph Giuliani, the possibility of 
kidnapping Gülen.87  In addition to these tactics, Turkish authorities have 
 
 81. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 70; GARRETT, supra note 74, at 218–49 (reviewing 
prosecution of foreign corporations); VERDIER, supra note 75. 
 82. RAUSTIALA, supra note 72, at 180. 
 83. DAVIS, supra note 70, at 149–51 (noting the collateral consequences of transnational 
corporate prosecutions on certain third parties, such as investors). 
 84. GARRETT, supra note 74, at 223, 246 (noting that the United States is one of a few 
countries with a broad standard for corporate criminal liability). 
 85. Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Turkey-U.S., June 7, 1979, 
T.I.A.S. No. 9891. 
 86. See generally Devlin Barrett & Adam Entous, U.S. Not Persuaded to Extradite Imam 
Over Turkey Coup, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 4, 2016, 8:39 PM), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/u-s-not-persuaded-to-extradite-imam-over-turkey-coup-1470357556 
[https://perma.cc/VZ2X-Q3C3]. 
 87. Julian Borger, Ex-Trump Aide Flynn Investigated over Plot to Kidnap Turkish 
Dissident–Report, GUARDIAN (Nov. 10, 2017, 12:49 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2017/nov/10/michael-flynn-trump-turkish-dissident-cleric-plot 
[https://perma.cc/AXU9-6RTE] (noting that Flynn reportedly discussed with the Turkish 
government the possibility of having Gülen kidnapped and sent to Turkey in exchange for 
fifteen million dollars); Carol D. Leonnig et al., Giuliani Pressed Trump to Eject Muslim 
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resorted to pressuring the United States to extradite Gülen by arresting U.S. 
citizens in Turkey, such as NASA scientist Serkan Golge, who was detained 
after an anonymous tip linked him to the 2016 coup attempt.88  American 
officials, including President Trump, demanded Turkey release Golge from 
solitary confinement, given the lack of incriminating evidence against him, 
and eventually succeeded in securing his return to the United States in June 
2020.89  Such foreign nations’ responses are often inevitable:  every country 
makes meaning of the world through a unique historical, linguistic, and 
cultural frame.90  Given the multidimensional nature of this interpretive act, 
a disjunct inevitably emerges when one country prosecutes a foreign national 
and another nation interprets such action.  This represents the critical tension 
for criminal justice on the global stage:  foreign perceptions of a politicized 
“David and Goliath” case, wherein a lone foreign national is caught in the 
gears of the omnivorous U.S. criminal justice machine.  Foreign actors may 
decry such action as wholly “political,” flattening U.S. government decision-
making from the reality—one that is decentralized, multifaceted, and 
complex91—to a caricature of a monolithic government actor with a singular 
motivation.  Globalization and technology hasten this dynamic.  Through 
both traditional and social media, foreign citizens can easily view, shortly 
thereafter, the law enforcement action taken in another country, sparking 
condemnation both from a foreign government and from its citizens. 
II.  THE PROMISE:  A PRINCIPLED PROSECUTORIAL FUNCTION 
This part now explains what role U.S. ELEP should play in foreign 
relations.  Consider the following hypothetical.  The White House is 
considering the best option to curb Chinese theft of COVID-19 vaccine 
research.92  What is the menu of policy options?  According to orthodox 
foreign relations strategy, one would likely default to the six foreign policy 
modalities (again:  diplomacy, cooperation agreements, trade, economic 
 
Cleric from U.S., A Top Priority of Turkish President, Former Officials Say, WASH. POST (Oct. 
15, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/giuliani-pressed-trump-to-eject-muslim-
cleric-from-us-a-top-priority-of-turkish-president-former-officials-say/2019/10/15/bf43d1ec-
ef68-11e9-b648-76bcf86eb67e_story.html [https://perma.cc/W7Q3-A8N5] (“Rudolph W. 
Giuliani privately urged President Trump in 2017 to extradite a Turkish cleric living in exile 
in the United States . . . .”). 
 88. Carlotta Gall, NASA Scientist Jailed in Turkey for 3 Years Recounts His Ordeal, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/09/world/europe/turkey-erdogan-
nasa-scientist-golge.html [https://perma.cc/BN7Y-MQEE]. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Steven Arrigg Koh, Polarization and The Criminal Trial 14 (June 4, 2021) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 91. In the most common scenario, the United States decides—collectively, through the 
complex interaction between state and federal prosecutorial bodies, grand juries or judicial 
charging, and domestic arrest or arrest abroad—to arrest and prosecute a foreign national. 
 92. See China Hackers Sought to Steal Coronavirus Vaccine Research, Says US, 
GUARDIAN (July 21, 2020, 8:36 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jul/22/china-
hackers-sought-to-steal-coronavirus-vaccine-research-says-us [https://perma.cc/B7BH-
6QPB] [hereinafter China Hackers]. 
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sanctions, military force, and foreign aid).93  The staffer could advise the 
president to diplomatically engage Chinese President Xi Jinping; more 
coercively, wield the power of trade tariffs; or engage in individualized or 
national economic sanctions.  Adjacent to this set of policy options, however, 
lies the U.S. criminal justice system.  Perhaps the best approach is to let 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigators and DOJ prosecutors 
open cases against individual Chinese nationals. 
Thus, this part will identify the desirable comparative advantage of 
criminal prosecution in the broader context of foreign policy options.  
Domestic criminalization literature partially helps us answer this question.  
Such scholarship clarifies criminal law as one available mode of regulation, 
albeit one that may “crowd out” sensible forms of policy regulation.94  
Indeed, scholars have criticized overcriminalization of public health policy,95 
immigration policy,96 poverty,97 homelessness,98 and women’s health,99 not 
to mention areas that should not be subject to regulation at all, such as race100 
 
 93. See Apodaca, supra note 3, at 2. 
 94. See SIMON, supra note 1, at 259–66 (discussing the mix of war and cancer metaphors 
that have been applied to poverty, crime, and terrorism); see also supra note 1. 
 95. See, e.g., Zita Lazzarini et al., Criminalization of HIV Transmission and Exposure:  
Research and Policy Agenda, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1350, 1350 (2013) (“More than half of 
US jurisdictions have laws criminalizing knowing exposure to or transmission of HIV, yet 
little evidence supports these laws’ effectiveness in reducing HIV incidence.  These laws may 
undermine prevention efforts outlined in the US National HIV/AIDS Strategy, in which the 
United States has invested substantial federal funds.”); J. Kelly Strader, Criminalization as a 
Policy Response to a Public Health Crisis, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 435, 435 (1994). 
 96. See, e.g., Rubén G. Rumbaut et al., Immigration and Crime and the Criminalization 
of Immigration, in THE ROUTLEDGE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF MIGRATION STUDIES 472, 
476 (Steven J. Gold & Stephanie J. Nawyn eds.); Liam Brennan, Sessions Is Criminalizing 




 97. See, e.g., Peter B. Edelman, Criminalization of Poverty:  Much More to Do, 69 DUKE 
L.J. ONLINE 114, 114 (2020); Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 644–46 (2009) (mapping the criminalization of welfare). 
 98. See, e.g., ALLARD K. LOWENSTEIN INT’L HUM. RTS. CLINIC, “FORCED INTO BREAKING 
THE LAW”:  THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN CONNECTICUT 2 (2016), 
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/schell/criminalization_of_homelessness_re
port_for_web_full_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/VC6V-DSDC] (“Laws that restrict behaviors 
in which people experiencing homelessness must engage to survive, as well as the practices 
used to enforce these laws, constitute what this report refers to as ‘making homelessness a 
crime’ or ‘the criminalization of homelessness.’”). 
 99. See, e.g., William Wan, Amid New Talk of Criminalizing Abortion, Research Shows 
the Dangers of Making It Illegal for Women, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2018/04/05/amid-new-talk-of-
criminalizing-abortion-research-shows-dangers-for-women/ [https://perma.cc/5RKQ-6WCC] 
(surveying recent state attempts to criminalize abortion). 
 100. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW:  MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS, 6–12 (2012); Angela Y. Davis, Race and Criminalization:  Black 
Americans and the Punishment Industry, in THE HOUSE THAT RACE BUILT 264, 264–65 
(Wahneema Lubiano ed., 1997) (discussing the structural character of racism in the U.S. 
criminal justice system). 
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and sexual orientation.101  Relatedly, scholars also bemoan 
overcriminalization of drug possession, wherein draconian sentencing laws 
have led to mass incarceration102 and, recently, triggered reform 
proposals.103  But after offering its descriptive insight, criminalization 
literature less often advances an affirmative case for what should be the 
proper role of criminal justice.  U.S. ELEP does not function in a vacuum; it 
may be used instead of, or alongside, other foreign policy options.  This 
reality forces us to make an affirmative case for what criminal justice does 
and does not best serve.  And it provides a baseline from which to measure 
the overcriminalization of foreign relations. 
The U.S. government best engages U.S. ELEP in instances that engage 
criminal justice’s distinctiveness and expressivism.  Consider the former.  
First, criminal justice is individualized:  it targets foreign nationals one at a 
time, as opposed to, for example, foreign aid.104  The question is always one 
of individual criminal responsibility.105  Second, it is retrospective, an ex 
post intervention in order to promote accountability for past actions, in 
contrast to negotiations of prospective bilateral agreements.  In criminal 
cases, finders of fact determine what occurred, as opposed to prognosticating 
 
 101. See, e.g., Kendall Thomas, The Eclipse of Reason:  A Rhetorical Reading of Bowers 
v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1805, 1806–07 (1993) (criticizing a case in which the U.S. 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a Georgia “sodomy” law); see also William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Hardwick and Historiography, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 631, 643–46 (same). 
 102. See Eisha Jain, Capitalizing on Criminal Justice, 67 DUKE L.J. 1381, 1388 (2018) 
(“The U.S. criminal justice system is a colossus, its reach unprecedented by both global and 
historical measures.”); Sanford H. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and 
Sentencing Processes, 75 HARV. L. REV. 904, 909 (1962) (“One kind of systematic 
nonenforcement by the police is produced by criminal statutes which seem deliberately to 
over-criminalize, in the sense of encompassing conduct not the target of legislative concern, 
in order to assure that suitable suspects will be prevented from escaping through legal 
loopholes as the result of the inability of the prosecution to prove acts which bring the 
defendants within the scope of the prohibited conduct.”). 
 103. See Nicholas Fandos, Senate Passes Bipartisan Criminal Justice Bill, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18/us/politics/senate-criminal-justice-
bill.html [https://perma.cc/5WP4-2JU5] (discussing the First Step Act). 
 104. To be clear, the basket of traits described below are what make U.S. ELEP distinctive.  
Any individual trait is shared with at least one of the other modalities.  For example, the trend 
toward individualization exists regarding sanctions and drone strikes. See generally Elena 
Chachko, Administrative National Security, 108 GEO. L.J. 1063 (2020).  Furthermore, a 
decision to prosecute an individual corporate officer may amount to prosecution of the 
government itself in instances where the company itself is a public-private hybrid.  Even when 
a company is completely private, governments and the general public may perceive that 
company as having quasi-citizen qualities. Cf. Kelly Couturier, How Europe Is Going After 
Apple, Google and Other U.S. Tech Giants, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/04/13/technology/how-europe-is-going-after-us-
tech-giants.html [https://perma.cc/A7ZG-HD27]; Trump Slams EU Over $5 Billion Fine on 
Google, REUTERS (July 19, 2018, 9:30 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-google-
antitrust-trump/trump-slams-eu-over-5-billion-fine-on-google-idUSKBN1K91YC 
[https://perma.cc/PQ8L-SHH9] (describing criticism by President Trump of the European 
Union’s fining of Google for antitrust violations). 
 105. See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41223, FEDERAL CONSPIRACY LAW:  A 
BRIEF OVERVIEW 10–11 (2020); 109. Rico Charges, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Jan. 22, 2020), 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-109-rico-charges 
[https://perma.cc/K5NH-QNJW]. 
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what will occur in the future.  Third, it involves a high degree of process.  In 
contrast to the six foreign policy modalities like military force, a criminal 
case must wind through domestic criminal legal process—indictment by a 
grand jury, review by judges, conviction, appeals, etc.—and sometimes 
through transnational criminal legal process, such as extradition.  Finally, it 
results in incarceration or execution, meaning that it implicates the 
deprivation of liberty.  Such sanction is the ultimate hallmark of criminal 
justice domestically.  When compared to foreign policy, it is more overtly 
punitive than diplomatic negotiations but less coercive than use of broader 
military force. 
The case of Joaquín Archivaldo Guzmán Loera (“El Chapo”) is 
particularly illustrative of such distinctiveness.  On January 19, 2017, the eve 
of President Trump’s inauguration, Mexico extradited El Chapo to the United 
States on charges of operating a continuing criminal enterprise and other 
drug-related charges.106  El Chapo, a Mexican national and head of the 
Sinaloa Cartel, had escaped from Mexican custody twice, leading the 
Mexican government to decide to extradite him to the United States.107  In 
February 2019, after a three-month trial, El Chapo was found guilty on all 
counts.108  In sum, the case exemplifies U.S. ELEP at its best:  the United 
States deploying its criminal justice system to prosecute an individual, 
nonstate actor wanted both in the United States and Mexico, who had 
engaged in past criminal conduct that both governments could prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt, thus warranting deprivation of liberty.  By engaging in 
prosecution in this manner, the United States was able to strengthen its 
foreign relations with Mexico. 
In addition to distinctiveness, U.S. ELEP harnesses criminal justice’s 
expressivism.  At its best, criminal justice expresses U.S. commitment to 
accountability for serious crimes, adjudicated before a neutral branch of 
government in adherence to a broader rule of law.109  Again, this insight 
highlights a normative ambiguity:  while criminal legal scholars rightly 
criticize the pathologies of U.S. criminal justice, foreign relations and 
international criminal legal scholars also correctly view criminal 
prosecutions as, at times, preferable to more destructive and/or less 
process-oriented foreign policy alternatives.  This was a central argument in 
the debates around the forum in which to prosecute Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed, the architect of the 9/11 attacks.  While the U.S. government 
cared about holding him morally culpable and deterring his and others’ 
conduct,110 the critical debate regarding forum included expressive aspects:  
either in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York 
 
 106. Koh, supra note 6, at 350. 
 107. Id. at 350–51. 
 108. Id. at 351. 
 109. This differentiates U.S. ELEP from domestic criminal prosecutions, which may 
express a collective judgment of retribution or deterrence. 
 110. Retribution and deterrence are of course integral to all criminal prosecutions.  But the 
expressiveness of the U.S. prosecution—projecting certain norms and values outside of the 
U.S. borders—has a greater impact on U.S. foreign policy. 
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(demonstrating America’s commitment to submitting even our most serious 
foes to criminal process in Article III federal courts) or in special military 
commissions in Guantanamo Bay (undermining such commitment).111  A 
similar impulse contributed to the U.S.-led establishment of the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo tribunals.  Instead of summarily executing the Nazis or the 
imperial Japanese, the United States expressed that it, in the words of 
Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, “stay the hand of vengeance” and 
submit enemy combatants to “the judgment of the law,” constituting “one of 
the most significant tributes that Power has ever paid to Reason.”112  
Similarly, the subsequent U.S.-backed113 international criminal tribunals—
like the U.N. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) and the U.N. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda—were 
designed to express that individuals, not a whole people, were accountable 
for atrocity crimes.114  As Professors David Luban and Antony Duff have 
noted, international criminal trials are effective in norm projection:  trials are 
not “politics by other means” but instead constitute expressive acts that 
telegraph to the world that mass atrocities are heinous crimes.115  U.S. ELEP 
does the same, for example, by conveying that suspected terrorists prosecuted 
in U.S. federal court should be held criminally responsible within our 
systems of criminal law and procedure.116 
 
 111. See CHARLIE SAVAGE, POWER WARS:  THE RELENTLESS RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL 
AUTHORITY AND SECRECY 87–88 (2015) (detailing the policy debates among the DOJ and the 
State Department regarding venue in the case). 
 112. Robert H. Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the U.S., Opening Statement Before the 
International Military Tribunal (Nov. 21, 1945); Koh, supra note 15, at 527. 
 113. See Koh, supra note 15, at 528. 
 114. Vincenzo Militello, The Personal Nature of Individual Criminal Responsibility and 
the ICC Statute, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 941, 944 (2007).  For this reason, only 199 defendants 
were tried at Nuremberg; the ICTY only indicted 161 people. About the ICTY, UNITED 
NATIONS:  INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 
https://www.icty.org/en/about [https://perma.cc/WG4V-EAAJ] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021); 
Nuremberg Trials, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEM’L MUSEUM (Jan. 5, 2018), 
https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/the-nuremberg-trials 
[https://perma.cc/7M5R-V8UG].  But again, these numbers belie the expressive potential of 
these cases, which targeted high-level offenders and sent a strong message of criminal 
accountability globally. 
 115. See Antony Duff, Authority and Responsibility in International Criminal Law, in THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 589, 593 (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 
2010); David Luban, Fairness to Rightness:  Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of 
International Criminal Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 569, 575–76 
(Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010).  In this way, international trials take on a 
different valence than pure domestic criminal law, which emphasizes punishment. Duff, 
supra, at 593; Luban, supra, at 575–76. 
 116. President Trump’s call to Ukranian President Volodymyr Zelensky occurred on July 
25, 2019, also highlights the same effect but inverted:  foreign criminal justice may impact 
domestic U.S. policy. Ayesha Rascoe, Who Was on the Trump-Ukraine Call?, NPR (Nov. 7, 
2019, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/11/07/775456663/who-was-on-the-trump-
ukraine-call [https://perma.cc/A7XE-6AE7].  In pressuring the Ukrainian president to 
investigate Hunter Biden, President Trump knew that an international headline reading 
“Hunter Biden Indicted in Kiev” would express something particularly wrongful about 
Biden’s actions, regardless of the retribution or deterrence for Biden personally. 
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To better apprehend the distinctive and expressive nature of U.S. ELEP, 
this Article now answers the thought experiment described above regarding 
Chinese theft of COVID-19 vaccine research.117  Such theory clarifies that 
prosecution is particularly desirable if isolated individuals perpetrated the 
theft but is less so if the theft is government-sponsored and systematic.  Given 
that prosecution is individualized, retrospective, and process-heavy and 
results in incarceration, prosecution is best deployed if certain “lone wolves” 
are stealing research.  These individuals may be identified through federal 
investigation and, if prosecuted, subjected to U.S. process that properly 
distinguishes them from the Chinese government or Chinese people more 
generally.  Prosecution also expresses U.S. condemnation of such actions 
globally, to dissuade other actors from engaging in such conduct.  However, 
if the theft is the product of a broader Chinese governmental enterprise of 
intellectual property theft—as could be the case for both China and 
Russia118—a few criminal cases are a drop in a much larger geopolitical 
strategic bucket.  The slow, individualized approach in criminal cases is 
ill-suited to guard against a broader immediate Chinese geopolitical strategy 
of vaccine-related intellectual property theft.  And the expressiveness of such 
cases is compromised, given it signals the blameworthiness of individuals 
when the Chinese government is more properly responsible.  In other words, 
if such theft is in fact government-sponsored, then it recasts prosecution—
like the July 2020 indictment, in the Eastern District of Washington, of 
Chinese nationals who hacked U.S. COVID-19 vaccine researchers119—as 
wrongly occupying the lead in foreign relations when other foreign policy 
tools, such as diplomacy, agreements, or sanctions,120 are more preferable to 
curtail the Chinese government’s intervention. 
This expressivism recasts commonly held scholarly conceptions of 
criminal justice as a policy option.  Professor George Fletcher once argued 
that criminal law should serve as a power that the state wields as a last resort, 
only when less drastic remedies have been exhausted.121  In a more realist 
way, Professor Dan Richman has noted that fundamental constitutional rights 
constitute “expensive appurtenances” that come along with criminal law, 
meaning that it may constitute a less appealing option than others available 
to the state; however, various institutional and political factors may combine 
to make criminal prosecutions the “sweet spot” for both those favoring 
 
 117. China Hackers, supra note 92. 
 118. Julian E. Barnes & Michael Venutolo-Mantovani, Race for Coronavirus Vaccine Pits 
Spy Against Spy, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/ 
05/us/politics/coronavirus-vaccine-espionage.html [https://perma.cc/C6LB-6EKH]. 
 119. Indictment at 1–4, United States v. Xiaoyu, No. 4:20-CR-6019 (E.D. Wash. July 7, 
2020). 
 120. Cf. Julian E. Barnes, Russia Is Trying to Steal Virus Vaccine Data, Western Nations 
Say, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/16/us/politics/vaccine-
hacking-russia.html [https://perma.cc/ZV2P-CFB7]; Barnes, supra note 11. 
 121. George P. Fletcher, The Nature and Function of Criminal Theory, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 
687, 700 (2000). 
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maximal and those favoring minimal government action.122  In the domestic 
context this makes sense, but in the foreign policy context it does not.  When 
alternatives to criminal prosecution include measures like military force, 
criminal prosecutions function as a less coercive tool of foreign policy than 
they do in domestic policy. 
The sum of this distinctiveness and expressivism immediately conjures 
three insights:  one institutional, one normative, and one cautionary.  The 
institutional insight reveals an intra-executive tension.  Foreign policy is a 
bread-and-butter, executive-driven function that falls squarely within the 
discretion of the U.S. president.  Meanwhile, criminal law enforcement turns 
on an autonomous U.S. DOJ that—while falling under presidential 
appointees—is supposed to be largely free of political, and particularly 
presidential, control.123  In this sense, it is beneficial for a president to 
publicly affirm that he lacks the power to withdraw indictment in certain 
cases:  the United States is signaling to the world that it is prosecuting not 
due to overt political antagonism but due to the considered, independent 
determination of its prosecutors under a statutory framework previously laid 
out by the political branches, affirming essential principles like notice and 
legality.  This is why, for example, in 2014, President Barack Obama publicly 
resisted calls to end DOJ investigations into French bank BNP Paribas, 
despite pressure from then-French President François Hollande to do so.124  
It is also evident in the Meng case, when Prime Minister Trudeau—in 
contrast to President Trump—stated that he could not interfere with the 
extradition process playing out in Canadian courts.125  These are not hollow 
statements but rather affirm the distinctiveness and expressivism of U.S. 
criminal justice globally. 
The normative insight is that U.S. ELEP may be positive for U.S. foreign 
relations.  At a high level of generality, all national governments have an 
interest in promoting criminal accountability, and states working together to 
promote criminal justice ends may be beneficial to both such governments 
and their nationals.126  The FIFA case, for example, earned high praise 
 
 122. Daniel Richman, Overcriminalization for Lack of Better Options:  A Celebration of 
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 123. Barack Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 
HARV. L. REV. 811, 823 (2017). 
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in BNP Dispute, REUTERS (June 5, 2014, 6:10 AM), https://www.reuters.com/ 
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 125. Andy Blatchford, Trudeau Rejects Calls to End Huawei Exec’s Extradition to U.S., 
Even If It Would Free Jailed Canadians in China, POLITICO (June 25, 2020, 1:10 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/25/justin-trudeau-huawei-executive-extradition-
339851 [https://perma.cc/X6Z3-W86V]; see Young, supra note 38. 
 126. This may include two countries working together to prosecute a national of one of the 
two countries.  For example, Mexico wanted El Chapo—a Mexican national—extradited to 
the United States for prosecution as much as the U.S. government did. See Joshua Partlow & 
Matt Zapotosky, Mexican Drug Lord Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán Extradited to U.S., WASH. 
POST (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/mexican-drug-
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globally from nations around the world, which saw the United States as 
holding accountable a deeply corrupt world soccer organization.127  Or, as 
another example, the United States and China promoted their mutual interest 
in combating the fentanyl scourge via the arrest of Liu Yong by Drug 
Enforcement Agency officials in New Orleans, which in turn led to an 
international investigation into Liu’s network of manufacturing and shipping 
fentanyl to American users.128  And the joint investigations into the world’s 
largest child pornography website,129 the Panama Papers,130 1Malaysia 
Development Berhad,131 and the “Elder Fraud Sweep”132 were mutually 
beneficial for all countries involved, promoting accountability for crimes, 
such as the distribution of child pornography, willful failure to file a Report 
of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR), conspiracy to violate the 
FCPA, and money laundering. 
The cautionary insight returns us to the aforementioned global arrest game.  
U.S. ELEP’s distinctive qualities characterize its limitations:  it targets 
individuals when broader state-oriented foreign policy engagement is more 
appropriate, and it introduces autonomous actors—such as grand juries, 
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges—into a policy space better suited 
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for wholly political direction.  And the expressive quality of criminal justice 
may be distorted given “tagging,” or the tendency of a given nation to attach 
variegated interpretive meanings to U.S. criminal prosecutions.  Some of the 
highest-profile cases are replete with such examples of tagging.  In the Meng 
case, this was obvious when Meng Wanzhou’s father and Huawei’s founder, 
Ren Zhengfei, initially stated his belief that “the legal systems of Canada and 
the United States are open, just and fair, and [would] reach a just 
conclusion.”133  However, in mid-February, Ren reversed course, calling the 
charges against Meng “politically motivated.”134  And the case led to The 
American Trap, a book written by a French national who was convicted for 
an FCPA violation and who sensationally accuses the United States of “war” 
on foreign companies.135  Heeding this cautionary note, this Article must thus 
consider the twin forces propelling expansion of U.S. ELEP.  This, in turn, 
helps to prescribe reforms to assure its principled function in foreign 
relations. 
III.  THE FEAR:  EXTRATERRITORIAL EXPANSION IN AN ERA OF MASS 
INCARCERATION 
Having described the reality and promise of U.S. ELEP, this Article now 
probes the fear:  Which forces may push U.S. ELEP past its distinctive and 
expressive function, thus risking the overcriminalization of foreign relations? 
Contemporary scholarship helpfully identifies the twin forces driving 
contemporary criminalization.136  First, criminalization through 
enforcement:  prosecutors and law enforcement aggressively marshal 
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764 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
existing criminal laws.137  The prosecutor’s office—as opposed to the 
courtroom or the criminal code—is where criminal law is fully fleshed out, 
particularly as new prosecutorial tools routinely become accepted parts of the 
opaque prosecutorial arsenal.138  Second, criminalization through 
legislation:  the political branches ratchet up ever-higher levels of sanctions 
for undesirable conduct, obviating the need for more thoughtful, considered 
policymaking.139  Once such regulation tips into criminal enforcement, it 
rarely moves back in the other direction.140 
This part argues that such twin forces contribute to the growth of foreign 
relations criminalization.  And, in particular, it shows a third cause of such 
expansionism:  presidential politicization, under the guise of the president’s 
foreign affairs authority.141 
A.  Prosecutorial and Legislative Criminalization 
Most scholars view prosecutors as a primary driver of 
overcriminalization.142  In this conception, our criminal justice system is too 
vast because of unchecked prosecutorial authority.143  Virtually no positive 
law governs how criminal justice must proceed institutionally because the 
Constitution broadly delegates law enforcement policy to the executive 
branch.144  The DOJ is part of the executive branch, and any new presidential 
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administration installs dozens of political appointees, confirmed by the 
Senate.145  Otherwise, prosecutors are unrestrained in making investigative 
and charging decisions; unlike civil law countries, prosecutors make 
decisions regarding investigation and charging that are unchecked by the 
judiciary or other authorities.146  One of many symptoms of such authority is 
the rate of plea bargains, which is the result of approximately 90 to 95 percent 
of all federal and state court matters.147 
Applied to U.S. ELEP, prosecutors may also drive the criminalization of 
foreign relations in two ways.148  First, the broad discretion that prosecutors 
enjoy may lead to a disproportionate impact on people, particularly people of 
color,149 lower-income individuals,150 and foreign nationals.151  This leads 
to the “othering” of foreign defendants, which exploits the targeting of 
foreign defendants in order to promote domestic solidarity.152  Second, 
prosecutorial discretion may also drive the expansion of the scope of 
substantive offenses and their sanctions.  Prosecutors freely deploy a mix of 
charges in a given case, some of which reflect ex ante political branch 
consideration of foreign policy concerns but some of which do not.  As I have 
shown previously, the judiciary is particularly deferential to prosecutors in 
foreign affairs prosecutions, construing statutes and rules to give more 
executive extraterritorial authority.153  Other scholars have attributed the 
 
executive supervision to a greater extent than other federal prosecutors, in our view these 
features of the Act give the Executive Branch sufficient control over the independent counsel 
to ensure that the President is able to perform his constitutionally assigned duties.”).  Similarly, 
in United States v. Nixon, the Court did not rule on whether the president has the inherent 
authority to direct a prosecutor to act, such as withdrawing a subpoena. See 418 U.S. 683, 702 
(1974); Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Can the President Control the Department of 
Justice?, 70 ALA. L. REV. 1, 21 (2018). 
 145. About DOJ, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/about 
[https://perma.cc/23BB-DXF2] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021); About Nominations, U.S. 
SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Nominations.htm 
[https://perma.cc/PDY7-8NW3] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021). 
 146. Note, Restoring Legitimacy:  The Grand Jury as the Prosecutor’s Administrative 
Agency, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1205, 1217 (2017). 
 147. Matt Clarke, Dramatic Increase in Percentage of Criminal Cases Being Plea 
Bargained, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Jan. 15, 2013), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/ 
news/2013/jan/15/dramatic-increase-in-percentage-of-criminal-cases-being-plea-bargained/ 
[https://perma.cc/7LGZ-6TWP]; LINDSEY DEVERS, PLEA AND CHARGE BARGAINING:  
RESEARCH SUMMARY (2011), https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/media/ 
document/PleaBargainingResearchSummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9AK-Y9KL]. 
 148. See also VERDIER, supra note 75, at viii (“[T]he expanding role of U.S. criminal 
prosecutors marks a fundamental shift in how international finance is overseen and 
regulated.”). 
 149. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 150. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 151. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 152. See generally Steven Arrigg Koh, Othering Across Borders, 70 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 
161, 165 (2021); see also Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:  
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1372 
(1988) (“Racism helps create an illusion of unity through the oppositional force of a symbolic 
‘other.’  The establishment of an ‘other’ creates a bond, a burgeoning common identity of all 
non-stigmatized parties—whose identity and interests are defined in opposition to the other.”). 
 153. See Koh, supra note 6, at 365–72. 
766 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
expansion of global bank prosecutions,154 corporate prosecutions,155 and 
FCPA cases156 to prosecutors.  The most egregious example is the DOJ’s 
aggressive position on the FCPA, wherein it maintains that it has jurisdiction 
over any foreign transaction denominated in U.S. dollars.157 
Criminalization literature also points to legislative criminalization as a 
second causal factor.158  Like prosecutorial criminalization, this is due in part 
to the fact that little positive law governs how criminal law or foreign policy 
should evolve substantively.  While the Constitution rigorously imposes 
criminal procedural rights,159 it provides little guidance on substantive 
criminal law, with the exception of certain offenses enumerated in Article I, 
Section 8 of the Constitution.160  As a result, Congress is free to use federal 
criminal law creatively because much of federal criminal law is optional 
(state criminal law exists alongside it), as long as it is formally tied to some 
express constitutional grant of lawmaking power.161  And while much ink 
has been spilled regarding Congress’s commerce power and, relatedly, the 
growth of federal criminal law more generally, comparatively little has been 
written on Congress’s foreign commerce clause power and general authority 
to criminalize extraterritorial conduct.162  Given this, there exists “an 
inexhaustible supply of criminal law in the United States—a supply largely 
unrestrained by the Constitution.”163  The political question and justiciability 
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doctrines only underscore and reinforce this on separation-of-powers 
grounds.164  Furthermore, each nation has the jurisdiction to prescribe the 
laws—including those criminalizing extraterritorial conduct—based on the 
principles of territory, nationality, passive personality, the protective 
principle, and universality.165  As such, the positive legal framework is 
sufficiently capacious to provide the United States with broad leeway to 
engage in robust extraterritorial criminal law enforcement. 
Since the modern codification of the federal criminal code in 1948, at least 
140 extraterritorial statutes have been passed into law.  The statutes break 
down into the categories of:  (1) special maritime & territorial jurisdiction; 
(2) special aircraft jurisdiction; (3) treaty-related; and (4) others.166  Each of 
these pieces of legislation is supported by a combination of political 
branches’ incentives for criminalization and prosecutorial overreach—
including statements from legislators that the United States be “tough on 
crime” abroad.  The Mann Act167 is the best example here, given it has been 
progressively amended to encompass human trafficking, child pornography, 
and extraterritorial sexual misconduct.168  This is ongoing.  As recently as 
2015, senators sponsored a bill to allow for state prosecutors (in addition to 
federal prosecutors) to be able to prosecute such offenses.169  In a statement 
on the U.S. Senate floor, Senator Dan Sullivan declared that doing so would 
“enable the resources and cooperation between state and federal prosecutors 
to ensure all cases of human trafficking are pursued and victims have 
justice.”170  Another general example of this view is Chapter 45 of Title 18 
of the U.S. Code—containing the most explicit extraterritorial criminal 
statutory language—which is entitled “Foreign Relations” and encompasses 
crimes like possession of property in aid of a foreign government and 
enlistment in foreign service.171  Additionally, a brief glance at the 
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 168. See Michael Conant, Federalism, the Mann Act, and the Imperative to Decriminalize 
Prostitution, 2 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 99, 99–100, 116–17 (1996). 
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highest-profile cases reveals that foreigners are indicted for fairly standard 
offenses—mail, bank, and wire fraud; money laundering; and conspiracy.172  
Meng and Huawei, for example, were indicted for specific violations of the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act173 (IEEPA) but also on more 
commonplace counts of bank fraud and wire fraud.174 
B.  Presidential Politicization 
Criminalization literature does not always focus on the role of the president 
of the United States, largely because the vast majority of criminal justice 
occurs at the state or local level.175  But in the particular context of U.S. 
ELEP, the president may also drive criminalization through presidential 
politicization, given that the president may install pliant DOJ leadership 
and/or personally direct criminal cases under the banner of diplomatic 
authority.  At the extreme, the president may violate a longstanding and 
valuable norm of DOJ autonomy that, while not codified, is desirable both in 
affirming prosecutorial process and in achieving better prosecutorial 
outcomes.176 
As a matter of positive law, the president has relatively free rein both in 
foreign affairs and criminal prosecution.  No formal law mandates how, 
when, or in what manner the White House may interfere with the activities 
of the DOJ and, in turn, the administration of criminal justice.177  Similarly, 
the Constitution gives the president relatively free rein institutionally with 
regard to foreign affairs—though scholars have hotly debated how the 
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state and local executives drive the expansion of governance through crime). 
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criminal investigations. SUSAN HENNESSEY & BENJAMIN WITTES, UNMAKING THE PRESIDENCY:  
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Constitution gives foreign relations power to the president.178  As a result, 
presidential engagement with U.S. ELEP is a double-edged sword.  On one 
hand, the president may sagely table prosecution in the name of quieting 
foreign relations turmoil.  On the other hand, the president may politicize 
prosecutorial decision-making. 
To illustrate this, consider the following.  Would it be proper for President 
Joe Biden to walk into a trade negotiation with Chinese President Xi Jinping 
and say, “if you do not stop stealing intellectual property (IP), I will direct 
the DOJ to aggressively prosecute your nationals for IP theft”?  Alternatively, 
can he say, “if you stop stealing IP, I will order the DOJ to withdraw 
indictments against many of your nationals”?  Or finally, would it be proper 
for him to say, “if you do not stop stealing IP, I will order the DOJ to find 
any federal charge possible against any Chinese national and prosecute them 
all”? 
While the President Biden scenario is a hypothetical, President Trump’s 
actions while in office exposed this perilous reality, evidenced by his 
relationship with DOJ leadership.  President Trump consistently 
demonstrated disrespect for DOJ autonomy by pressuring the DOJ and/or 
firing its leadership.  During the earliest days of his administration, he fired 
Acting Attorney General Sally Yates for opposing the litigation of the 
“Muslim ban,” which she believed was unlawful.179  He then fired FBI 
Director James Comey over the Russia investigation, despite the FBI 
director’s ten-year term and the FBI’s historical freedom from White House 
interference.180  In 2018, President Trump fired Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions, largely due to Sessions’s recusal from the Russia investigation.181  
And in 2020, President Trump fired Geoffrey S. Berman, the United States 
Attorney for the Southern District of New York, whose office had prosecuted 
and launched investigations into Trump and his allies.182  In their stead, 
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President Trump appointed DOJ officials with a diminished commitment to 
DOJ autonomy.  Attorney General William Barr is the most salient example, 
having manifested a disregard for DOJ autonomy when failing to recuse 
himself from overseeing the Russia investigation and eventually recasting the 
Mueller report findings in his own public summary; suggesting that political 
bias existed behind the initiation of the Mueller investigation; and defying a 
congressional subpoena to explain the origin of the proposed citizenship 
question on the 2020 Census.183  Additionally, President Trump’s 
handpicked Deputy Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen—who was the head of 
the DOJ until the beginning of the Biden administration—lacked any 
prosecutorial experience whatsoever.184 
Compromised DOJ leadership highlights a second, worrying aspect of 
presidential politicization:  White House control over the administration of 
individual cases.  While President Trump overtly called for the indictment of 
President Obama and then-former Vice President Biden,185 the Roger Stone 
case best exemplifies this fear.  On February 10, 2020, prosecutors submitted 
a sentencing memorandum recommending that Stone, who was a vocal 
supporter of President Trump and who had been convicted of seven counts 
of obstructing and lying to Congress as well as witness tampering, receive a 
sentence within the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range of seven to nine 
years.186  In the early hours of February 11, 2020, President Trump expressed 
his disapproval of the recommendation over Twitter, calling it “a horrible and 
very unfair situation.”187  Later that day, shortly after a DOJ official told 
reporters that the DOJ considered the recommendation “extreme and 
excessive and grossly disproportionate,” the DOJ filed an amended 
sentencing memorandum, which insisted that its previous recommendation 
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“would not be appropriate,” instead “defer[ring] to the court as to what 
specific sentence is appropriate.”188  That same afternoon, all four 
prosecutors responsible for the initial recommendation announced their 
withdrawal from the case and, for one, from the DOJ entirely.189  Ultimately, 
President Trump commuted Stone’s sentence, to widespread criticism.190  On 
December 23, 2020, President Trump granted clemency to Roger Stone, as 
well as two other close allies of the president.191 
Applied to U.S. ELEP, this presidential direction of leadership and case 
management leads to worrying results.  Take the recent case of General 
Salvador Cienfuegos Zepeda, the former Mexican Secretary of National 
Defense.  On October 15, 2020, U.S. authorities arrested Cienfuegos at Los 
Angeles International Airport on federal charges of money laundering and 
conspiracy to manufacture, import, and distribute narcotics in the United 
States.192  Then, in November 2020, the DOJ made an about-face, moving to 
dismiss the indictment because “[t]he United States . . . determined that 
sensitive and important foreign policy considerations outweigh the 
government’s interest in pursuing the prosecution of the defendant . . . and 
therefore require dismissal of the case.”193  Some public commentary rightly 
called this an “eyebrow raiser”; U.S. District Judge Carol B. Amon, the 
presiding judge over the case, felt similarly, calling the acting U.S. Attorney 
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to court to personally address why the DOJ had so moved.194  Some 
speculated that this change owes to President Trump “paying back” President 
Andrés Manuel López Obrador of Mexico, who had not recognized 
then-President-elect Biden’s victory in the 2020 election.195  While the 
United States has said it will cooperate with the Mexican prosecution of the 
case, it is an open question whether the Mexican government even has 
capacity to resolve such crimes.196  This case thus demonstrates the threat of 
presidential politicization:  the specter of direct White House case 
management, delivered by pliant DOJ leadership.197 
IV.  THE FUTURE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN FOREIGN RELATIONS 
This part proposes reforms to guard against the overcriminalization of 
foreign relations and fortify U.S. ELEP’s distinctive and expressive 
function.198  To do so, this part grapples with two long-standing normative 
ambiguities.  First, with regard to the executive, this part considers the 
president’s role in criminal prosecutions. Second, with regard to the 
legislature, this part considers the normative basis for criminalizing human 
conduct.  Ultimately, this part proposes three reforms: presidential 
distancing, prosecutorial integration, and legislative de-escalation. 
A.  Executive Reforms:  The White House, DOJ, and Line Prosecutor 
Regarding the executive branch, the necessary structural reform requires 
presidential distancing—thickening the layer between the White House and 
DOJ and prosecutorial integration—thinning out the layer between Main 
Justice and the United States Attorney’s Offices (USAOs). 
As a threshold matter, the president’s role must be clarified in such cases.  
Scholars have lightly touched on the nature and extent of DOJ autonomy as 
part of a “classic debate” about the executive branch’s unitary nature.199  And 
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scholars have focused less on presidential enforcement authority, despite its 
centrality in the president’s constitutional duty to “take Care” that the laws 
be faithfully executed.200 
While such academic debates play out, the view shared by most in 
government—including myself as a former federal prosecutor—is that three 
layers of separation do and should exist between the White House and 
DOJ.201  First, in practice, a norm has long existed of DOJ autonomy from 
direct White House control.202  On the “front end,” a long-standing norm 
exists against the president ordering a prosecution, reducing risk of 
politicized prosecutions.203  On the “back end,” a norm prohibits the 
president from ordering the cessation of an investigation or prosecution, for 
similar reasons.204  Yet nowhere are these norms clearly defined.205  In 
contrast to other agencies like the Federal Trade Commission and Federal 
Election Commission (FEC),206 no legislation makes DOJ independent of the 
 
966 (2001); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government:  Separation of Powers 
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 579, 581 (1984).  These questions arose with 
particular urgency during Watergate. See Green & Roiphe, supra note 144, at 17–22. 
 200. See, e.g., Andrias, supra note 144, at 1033–34 (“[S]cholars have extensively debated 
presidential involvement in rulemaking, but they have undertaken remarkably little analysis 
of the President’s role in agency enforcement.” (footnote omitted)); Rachel E. Barkow, 
Clemency and Presidential Administration of Criminal Law, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 802, 805–06, 
846–49 (2015) (“There is now a vigorous debate about where the President’s duty under the 
Take Care Clause ends and legitimate enforcement discretion given limited resources 
begins.”); see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; Shalev Roisman, Presidential Law, 105 MINN. L. 
REV. 1269, 1292–93 (2021); Shalev Roisman, Presidential Factfinding, 72 VAND. L. REV. 
825, 845–55 (2019). 
 201. See Green & Roiphe, supra note 144, at 22 (“Attorney General nominees since 
Watergate have endorsed the principle of prosecutorial independence from the President, and 
Senators have regarded a commitment to independence from the President as an essential 
qualification for the position.  DOJ officials assume that prosecutorial decisions should not be 
influenced by partisan political considerations that may motivate the White House.  Internal 
DOJ policy likewise presupposes that prosecutors should be independent.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 202. Obama, supra note 123, at 823 (“[W]ithin the executive branch, the President’s direct 
influence is subject to constraints designed to safeguard the fair enforcement of the law.”).  
Attorney General nominees since Watergate have also endorsed this autonomy principle. 
Green & Roiphe, supra note 144, at 19. 
 203. Green & Roiphe, supra note 144, at 16 (“But, presidents do not, as a general matter, 
tell the FBI when to initiate or terminate particular investigations.  Nor do they direct federal 
prosecutors whether charges against an individual should be presented to the grand jury or 
how pending charges should be prosecuted.”); Obama, supra note 123, at 823 (“For good 
reason, particular criminal matters are not directed by the President personally but are handled 
by career prosecutors and law enforcement officials who are dedicated to serving the public 
and promoting public safety.  The President does not and should not decide who or what to 
investigate or prosecute or when an investigation or prosecution should happen.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 204. See, e.g., infra note 216 and accompanying text. 
 205. See HENNESSEY & WITTES, supra note 176, at 180–85 (describing various historical 
U.S. presidential interventions in law enforcement policy and, in some instances, criminal 
cases). 
 206. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58; Federal Election Campaign Act 
Amendments, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974); Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, 
Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 
770–71 (2013) (surveying the enabling statutes of independent and executive agencies to 
774 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
president,207 leaving it to the DOJ and White House to delineate this line.208  
Likewise, no federal statute ever explicitly authorized the president to make 
decisions in federal criminal matters; it is Congress’s role to determine the 
scope of the president’s authority over criminal justice, and Congress has 
acquiesced in the norm of DOJ autonomy.209  A second layer of prosecutorial 
autonomy insulates USAOs from Main Justice oversight in Washington, 
D.C.  As is now relatively well settled as an institutional matter,210 each of 
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[https://perma.cc/X7PB-N7ST] (discussing the president’s “virtually unlimited authority and 
discretion” to fire political appointees).  At the same time, they also know that their positions 
are “stickier” than others in a presidential administration, due to the norm of DOJ autonomy. 
See id. 
 210. See Green & Roiphe, supra note 144, at 37 (“If the division of authority between the 
Attorney General and subordinate DOJ lawyers is relatively settled, particularly to the 
satisfaction of the DOJ and its lawyers, the division of authority between the President and the 
Attorney General with regard to criminal prosecutions is not.”). 
2021] THE CRIMINALIZATION OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 775 
the ninety-three USAOs constitutes a largely autonomous nerve center of 
control for its given territorial jurisdiction.  In the vast majority of cases, 
USAOs make independent decisions regarding which cases to investigate 
and prosecute, without any clearance by Main Justice.  Such localized 
discretion has been made possible, in part, by the steady growth of the federal 
caseload.211  Moreover, the transformation of federal prosecution into a 
largely administrative system in the latter part of the twentieth century, 
facilitated by the rise of plea negotiations and the concomitant decline of 
judicial oversight, has steadily expanded the role and authority of USAOs.212  
Third and finally, individual line prosecutors—the front-line federal 
prosecutors at the DOJ—maintain a large amount of discretion in individual 
cases under their charge.  Individual prosecutors are, for example, making a 
large number of decisions regarding their dockets, including investigations, 
plea agreements, and motion practice.  Most often, prosecutors work under 
the direction of a criminal division chief or deputy chief and also alongside a 
variety of other teams.  In general, Main Justice commits only few resources 
to local USAO prosecutions, focusing instead on broad policy initiatives and 
cases presenting “visible or controversial political questions.”213 
This descriptive, three-layered picture undermines a tempting but incorrect 
suspicion about DOJ prosecution:  that it is politically directed “all the way 
down.”  In fact, prosecutorial decision-making falls into an ambiguous zone 
that, while not immune from political control, is somewhat insulated from it.  
This is desirable.  Criminal prosecution must be largely independent to avoid 
outright politicization, and yet it must be democratically responsive to the 
broader electorate to ensure a just set of prosecutorial priorities.  Applied to 
U.S. ELEP, this means that U.S. criminal cases with foreign policy 
ramifications are not always U.S. criminal cases with foreign policy 
motivations and, more often than is recognized, the White House is in the 
dark regarding extraterritorial criminal law enforcement. 
The Meng case is a good example.  Does the Canadian arrest of a 
high-level Chinese business executive constitute an explicit White House 
 
 211. See Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking the Identity and Role of United States Attorneys, 6 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM L. 369, 406 (2009). 
 212. See id.  Once again, exceptions exist to this rule.  Main Justice reserves certain subject 
matter expertise on issues such as civil rights prosecutions, narcotics and dangerous drugs, 
and computer crimes. See Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, DEP’T OF JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ccips [https://perma.cc/WF63-Q8N7] (last visited Sept. 17, 
2021); Criminal Section, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/crt/criminal-section 
[https://perma.cc/5ZZL-WSGV] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021); Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs 
Section (NDDS), U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/criminal/ndds 
[https://perma.cc/H3VQ-D2W6] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021).  The Office of Enforcement 
Operations must clear certain law enforcement measures, such as electronic and video 
surveillance, witness protection, witness immunity requests, and attorney subpoenas. Office 
of Enforcement Operations (OEO), U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/criminal-
oeo [https://perma.cc/8KY2-J7SH] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021); see also U.S. Dep’t of Just., 
Just. Manual §§ 9-7.110, 9-2.112 (2020).  And U.S. Attorneys—political appointees—govern 
the administration of cases within a given USAO. Beale, supra note 211, at 406. 
 213. Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, “The U.S. Attorneys Scandal” and the 
Allocation of Prosecutorial Power, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 187, 201 (2008). 
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attempt to leverage the U.S. criminal justice system in order to gain an 
advantage in bilateral trade negotiations?  It is a tempting theory, given 
contemporary U.S. policy toward China.  The Trump administration 
perceived China as a geopolitical threat and has engaged in a trade war as 
retribution for, among other things, its alleged theft of intellectual 
property.214  But both President Trump and Prime Minister Trudeau stated 
that they had no advance knowledge of the arrest, and this is likely true:  
under standard norms of prosecutorial autonomy and standard procedure in 
federal extradition cases,215 prosecutors are under no obligation to and do not 
inform the chief executive of imminent arrests.216 
This laudable, triple-layered DOJ autonomy clarifies why presidential 
politicization is so problematic:  it unsettles the mixed political-apolitical 
nature of prosecutorial decision-making.  Professors Bruce A. Green and 
Rebecca Roiphe have advanced a “hypothetical foreign-policy scenario” in 
which the president directs DOJ attorneys to make decisions in a criminal 
case.217  Unfortunately, this scenario is no longer so hypothetical.  While 
Canada maintained that Meng’s arrest was apolitical, Trump further 
politicized the arrest, saying that “he would intervene if that would help 
secure a good trade deal with China,”218 against the advice of his top 
advisers.219 
1.  Presidential Distancing 
Presidential politicization accommodates the distinctiveness of U.S. ELEP 
but undermines its expressive potential.  On one hand, presidential control of 
DOJ prosecutions means, in theory, a better opportunity for a president to 
deploy criminal prosecution judiciously, balancing it against other foreign 
policy tools and priorities.  At the same time, however, the unfortunate reality 
is that, under the direct political control of the White House, the expressivism 
of criminal prosecutions is severely compromised. 
This compromised expressivism deleteriously affects other U.S. law 
enforcement activity and triggers the burgeoning global arrest game.  For 
 
 214. A Quick Guide to the US-China Trade War, BBC NEWS (Jan. 16, 2020), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-45899310 [https://perma.cc/A5M5-X8NX]. 
 215. As will be seen infra, such traditional norms were increasingly imperiled during the 
Trump administration. 
 216. Memorandum, supra note 208.  And though President Trump initially claimed that he 
might intervene to release Meng, his administration later walked back this claim. Vivian 
Salama & Sadie Gurman, Trump Aides Warn Him Against Intervening in Huawei Case, WALL 
ST. J. (Dec. 3, 2018, 10:32 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-aides-warn-him-
against-intervening-in-huawei-case-11544710475 [https://perma.cc/QDC2-JC27].  Indeed, 
from Trump’s perspective, the case arose at an inopportune diplomatic time, just after a 
seeming détente between the United States and China in their trade dispute. See, e.g., Steven 
Arrigg Koh, The Huawei Arrest:  How It Likely Happened and What Comes Next, JUST SEC. 
(Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/61799/huawei-arrest-happened/ 
[https://perma.cc/6VZH-X3FD]. 
 217. Green & Roiphe, supra note 209, at 1834. 
 218. See In A Row Between China and America, supra note 43. 
 219. Salama & Gurman, supra note 216. 
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example, in September 2019, a Spanish court took the highly unusual step of 
denying a U.S. request for the extradition of Hugo Carvajal, former 
intelligence chief of Venezuela.220  The Spanish court ruled that the charges 
against Carvajal were too “abstract” and, worryingly, tagged the case as 
“within the American political strategy toward Venezuela.”221  The Spanish 
appellate division later reversed—ruling in favor of the Spanish government 
and the U.S. request for extradition.222  However, by the time the court 
rendered its decision, Carvajal had been released from detention.223  He has 
since gone missing, though he is allegedly in talks with the United States 
about surrendering since being indicted alongside President Maduro.224 
Thus, presidential distancing is required so that the president may not 
directly order or otherwise interfere with foreign affairs prosecutions.  The 
most permanent means of assuring this is the most intuitive:  the political 
branches could pass legislation to insulate the DOJ in its prosecutorial 
mission.  A classic proposal, at times echoed by other scholars and mooted 
especially in the wake of Watergate, is that the DOJ be converted into an 
independent agency, wherein the Attorney General may act highly 
autonomously and only be removed “for cause.”225  In February 2020, 
Professor Cass Sunstein publicly revived this proposal in the mainstream 
press.226  However, this proposal has three critical flaws.  First and most 
importantly, this legislative option is likely foreclosed due to the Supreme 
Court’s 2020 decision in Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau,227 which held it unconstitutional for an independent agency to have 
one single director who the president may only remove “for cause.”228  
 
 220. Raphael Minder, Spanish Court Calls U.S. Extradition Request Politically Motivated, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/17/ 
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 221. Id. 
 222. See Raphael Minder, Venezuela’s Ex-Spy Chief, Wanted in U.S., Is Missing in Spain, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/13/world/europe/venezuela-
spain-hugo-carvajal.html [https://perma.cc/3CXX-WLCB]. 
 223. See id. 
 224. See id.; see also Ex-Venezuelan Spy Chief Hugo Carvajal May Surrender to U.S., 
JAPAN TIMES (Mar. 29, 2020), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/03/29/world/crime-
legal-world/venezuela-spy-chief-hugo-carvajal-surrender-us/ [https://perma.cc/KF73-EZT5]. 
 225. Ervin Says Justice Agency Should Be Independent Unit, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 1973), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1973/12/13/archives/ervin-says-justice-agency-should-be-
independent-unit.html [https://perma.cc/N2C4-JRFJ].  Such division is common at the state 
level, where many state attorneys general are independent of the governor. See William P. 
Marshall, Break Up the Presidency?:  Governors, State Attorneys General and Lessons from 
the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2453–61 (2006).  Forty-eight states have some 
variation on this structure. Id. 
 226. See Cass R. Sunstein, Opinion, Imagine That Donald Trump Has Almost No Control 
over Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/20/ 
opinion/sunday/trump-barr-justice-department.html [https://perma.cc/H6NS-DJPC]. 
 227. 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020). 
 228. Id. at 2197–99.  Previously, the Court had recognized that executive power may be 
severed from presidential control, and Professor Sunstein’s proposal was written based on that 
assumption. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 665–68 (1988) (declining to hold that a 
president possesses complete executive power, including federal prosecutorial power); Green 
& Roiphe, supra note 144, at 30. 
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Second—assuming a narrow reading of Seila Law—DOJ leadership could be 
converted from a lone attorney general into a group of commissioners, 
similar to the way in which the FEC is structured.229  While such a change 
would arguably pass constitutional muster, it represents such a dramatic 
institutional reform that it necessitates tremendous additional scholarly 
analysis before implementation.230  Third, DOJ-related legislation is 
politically unlikely due to contemporary political gridlock in Washington, 
D.C.231 
Given these unlikely statutory prospects, this section now turns to more 
achievable intra-executive reforms.  The Biden administration must publicly 
commit itself to greater transparency regarding its norms of DOJ autonomy, 
as then-Attorney General Eric Holder did in his 2009 memorandum on White 
House communication and as the Bush administration ultimately did in a 
2007 memorandum in the wake of the firing of Attorney General Alberto 
Gonzalez—but as the Trump administration failed to do.232  Such an explicit 
policy affirms that such norms are, and have always been, integral to 
 
 229. By contrast, a broad reading of Seila Law would prohibit independent agencies 
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PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/06/supreme-court-seila-law-v-cfpb.html 
[https://perma.cc/YJY5-NUT4].  This is an open question, going forward, for the Supreme 
Court. 
 230. Both history and institutional design suggest that such a change would be dramatic.  
The attorney general role was established by the Judiciary Act of 1789—the same early, 
landmark legislation that established the U.S. federal judiciary—and has led the DOJ since 
1870. About the Office, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Mar. 12, 20121), 
https://www.justice.gov/ag/about-office [https://perma.cc/M8CR-6DLM].  While such 
history by no means prohibits meaningful institutional reform, it begs numerous questions:  
How would the commissioners be selected?  What would their incentives be, and how would 
such incentives differ from that of a singular attorney general? 
 231. It is possible that both parties will find persuasive the argument for greater DOJ 
independence.  The Republican Party is currently concerned with allegations that President 
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Democrats Ask for Investigation of DOJ Decisions to Drop Flynn Case, HILL (May 8, 2020, 
2:04 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/496831-democrats-ask-for-investigation-of-
doj-decision-to-drop-flynn-case [https://perma.cc/5UGP-4LGS]; see also supra Parts I.B.1, 
III.B (analyzing the Michael Flynn and Roger Stone cases, respectively). 
 232. As noted above, President Obama largely upheld the norm, while the Bush 
administration controversy regarding the firing of seven U.S. Attorneys led to recognition that 
a president acts illegitimately when he fires such appointees “midstream” during a presidential 
term. See Memorandum, supra note 208, at 1; Memorandum from the Attorney General for 
Heads of Department Components and United States Attorneys 1 (Dec. 19, 2007), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2008/04/15/ag-121907.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CGJ9-R6NZ].  The only guidance from the Trump administration regarding 
White House-DOJ contact was a memorandum to White House staff in 2017.  See 
Memorandum from Donald F. McGahn II, Counsel to the President, to All White House Staff 
(Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.politico.com/f/?id=0000015a-dde8-d23c-a7ff-dfef4d530000 
[https://perma.cc/N5CM-VFX9]. 
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presidential and executive structure.233  This public standard not only 
fortifies autonomy between the White House and DOJ but also bolsters the 
integrity of individual USAOs and AUSAs.  The ethical rules and norms 
regulating prosecutors’ professional conduct, such as disinterestedness, are 
vital to preserving their function before the judiciary; presidential 
involvement in criminal prosecutions impedes such function.234  Importantly, 
when prosecutors are pressured to violate certain norms, they may withdraw 
from the cases or resign.235 
This policy also finds the sweet spot wherein the president does not control 
criminal cases “all the way down” but is still apprised of forthcoming 
criminal cases.  The president can still install political appointees to lead the 
DOJ.  Even the most independent agencies—think the Federal Reserve or 
National Labor Relations Board—rightly have a political nexus to 
installation of leadership that share presidential priorities.236  But at the same 
time, political appointees’ general guidance regarding overall prosecutorial 
priorities does not mean presidential or even political appointee control of 
granular case management.  Such appointees could still alert the White House 
about imminent arrests.  As noted above, it is very likely that both President 
Trump and Prime Minister Trudeau were unaware of Meng’s arrest in 
Canada.  While this is appropriate, it is also similarly appropriate for the DOJ 
to alert the president about certain law enforcement activities.237 
 
 233. See generally Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV. 
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incarceration. Obama, supra note 123, at 823–25; Andrias, supra note 144, at 1066–67.  But 
see David Cole, Why Hasn’t Obama’s Clemency Initiative Helped More Nonviolent Drug 
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2.  Prosecutorial Integration 
A more autonomous DOJ still presents the problem of prosecutorial 
overcriminalization.  In other words, the fact that the United States has a 
stronger, brighter institutional line between criminal justice and foreign 
policy does not immunize against the pathologies of too much substantive 
criminal law and related enforcement.  Greater insulation of the DOJ upholds 
prosecutorial integrity, and thus expressivism, abroad but simultaneously 
opens the door to the aforementioned clumsy prosecutorial decision-making 
that may undermine distinctiveness.  The necessary structural reform is 
prosecutorial integration—i.e., thinning out the layer between Main Justice 
and the USAOs.  Until now, the mainstream prosecutorial attitude has been, 
in a sense:  “we’re going to enforce the law and if it creates foreign policy 
issues, then so be it.”  DOJ must attend to this collective institutional 
perception. 
At the second layer—the space between Main Justice in Washington, D.C., 
and the USAOs—prosecutorial integration requires that Main Justice be clear 
on foreign affairs prosecutions.  Main Justice is part of the National Security 
Council, is engaged on a daily basis with the Legal Adviser’s Office at the 
State Department (specifically the Office of Law Enforcement and Security), 
and is comparatively more hardwired into the executive-branch-wide 
coordination around international affairs.238  Such procedures would not be 
as much of a power grab as they may seem.  Routinely, various law 
enforcement techniques and prosecutorial decisions are made by Main 
Justice due to their sensitive nature.  For example, the Office of Enforcement 
Operations must clear wiretaps, video surveillance, and other forms of 
federal electronic surveillance.239  Specifically, every one of the ninety-three 
offices should develop a more robust expertise around international issues, 
given that, as the Obama administration’s DOJ Criminal Division head once 
stated, international and cyber offenses constitute the two most critical 
emerging fronts in federal criminal justice today.240  To do so, it should 
bolster the knowledge and function of the national and international security 
coordinators in each USAO.  Such coordinators—AUSAs trained by the 
Office of International Affairs in the Criminal Division of Main Justice in 
 
 238. Office of the Legal Adviser for Law Enforcement and Intelligence, U.S. DEP’T OF 
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transnational and international issues arising in U.S. federal criminal 
prosecution—currently serve as the initial point of contact for every USAO 
“on matters relating to foreign relations, intelligence, and national 
defense.”241  Their expertise and connection to Main Justice should be 
strengthened through a more concerted DOJ-wide effort to coordinate the 
investigation, charging, and prosecution of cases with international 
dimensions.242 
At the third layer, the AUSAs themselves, prosecutorial integration 
requires that DOJ charging policy be amended to include a consideration of 
foreign consequences, alongside the other traditional factors that govern 
when to charge a defendant for an offense.  As discussed earlier, criminal 
justice is expressive, but the expressive benefits of criminal justice are 
compromised when the U.S. criminal system clumsily projects itself abroad, 
triggering tagging and fostering the global arrest game.243  Prosecutorial 
decision-making must grapple with this reality; it is poised to do so given 
capacious prosecutorial discretion.244  As of now, the Justice Manual entry 
on initiation of prosecution—the authoritative DOJ-wide guidance on 
whether and how to charge an individual with a crime—lists as one of its 
nine factors “federal law enforcement priorities, including any federal law 
enforcement initiatives or operations aimed at accomplishing those 
priorities.”245  The DOJ’s guidance should be amended to include language, 
such as: “the effects of such prosecutions on federal interests and foreign 
relations.”  Such additional guidance increases the likelihood that USAOs 
and AUSAs will consider the broader communicative dynamics of their 
decision-making in foreign relations.  Such an amendment is very plausible; 
the Justice Manual already recognizes that charging decisions may vary when 
another jurisdiction, including a foreign jurisdiction, is already subjecting a 
person to foreign prosecution.246  The Justice Manual also recognizes special 
policy concerns around corporate prosecution.247 
B.  Legislative Reform:  Legislative De-escalation & the Search for 
Normative Foundations 
Moving from the executive to the legislative branch, the third necessary 
reform is for the political branches to engage in legislative de-escalation, or 
the ratcheting down of criminal sanctions for certain criminal conduct.  To 
do so, the branches should not engage in a relative approach, claiming merely 
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 242. See id. 
 243. See supra Part II. 
 244. See generally Bellin, supra note 142, at 176–81. 
 245. U.S. Dep’t of Just., U.S. Att’ys Manual § 9-27.230 (2020). 
 246. Id. § 9-27.240. 
 247. Id. § 9-28.400 (“[C]orporate conduct, particularly that of national and multi-national 
corporations, necessarily intersects with federal economic, tax, and criminal law enforcement 
policies.  In applying these Principles, prosecutors must consider the practices and policies of 
the appropriate Division of the Department and must comply with those policies to the extent 
required by the facts presented.”). 
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“we need fewer extraterritorial criminal statutes.”  A more rigorous, effective 
path is a principled one stating that “extraterritorial criminal statutes are only 
appropriate for certain types of undesirable human conduct.”  Thus, this 
section grapples with the following question:  What human conduct should 
be criminalized?  Given the vast scope of this topic, this section presents a 
few different approaches, accounting for the development of research in this 
area.  Scholars can be divided into two broad schools of thought:  the 
mainstream realist school and the nascent normative school. 
The realist school dominates as the governing paradigm in criminal legal 
scholarship.  According to this approach, U.S. criminal law evolved to be 
only “what criminal justice actors did, nothing more.”248  From this 
perspective, there has been a “creep” of criminalization since the nation’s 
founding and particularly over the last few decades.249  As Professors Dan 
Richman and Bill Stuntz have persuasively argued, no principled line has 
animated substantive criminalization; instead, our current political moment 
is one wherein legislators have publicly positioned themselves to voters as 
“tough” on crime250 and wherein judicial articulation of greater criminal 
procedural protection has triggered an expansive criminal legislative 
response.251  The realist school rightly observes that a rigorous principle for 
criminalizing conduct would readily guard against overcriminalization, given 
that it would “anchor our decisions about when criminal sanctions should be 
used as a tool of government power at the border between ‘mere’ regulation 
and prosecution.”252  The realist school also recognizes that a failure to 
articulate a viable account of criminalization has led to “intellectual chaos,” 
due in part to the Anglo-American conflation of law and police power.253  In 
fact, it recognizes that “[t]he absence of a viable account of criminalization 
constitutes the single most glaring failure of penal theory as it has developed 
on both sides of the Atlantic.”254  However, the realist school acknowledges 
the reality that no principle can be drawn at the dividing lines between civil 
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and criminal sanction, nor in those between federal, state, and local criminal 
justice.255 
The smaller, normative school agrees with this realist portrait of the U.S. 
criminal justice system’s exponential growth.  But it goes a step further in 
asking the following question:  As a normative matter, what should be the 
principle for criminalizing human conduct?  The normative school observes 
that this question is rarely asked and is thus largely unanswered because the 
starting point for criminal theory is instead the justification of punishment.256  
As a result, every first-year law student is introduced to criminal law through 
its philosophical justifications:  retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, 
rehabilitation, and others.257  But such classic questions turn on justifications 
for the nature of criminal punishment and say less about what conduct should 
trigger such punishment. 
Fortunately, the normative school has spawned a recent “flurry” of 
scholarship on the question of criminalization.258  Scholars such as 
Professors Michael Moore and Douglas Husak have considered this question 
in the past, while Professors Antony Duff and Joshua Kleinfeld have 
provided a strong reconstructivist take on this question.259  Promising work 
is also being done on the development of a normative core for international 
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crimes.260  But it is “striking . . . how late this interest comes in the 
maturation of the field and how small it is relative to the massive attention 
given to punishment.”261  Indeed, “the theory of criminal wrongdoing is a 
pinprick relative to the theory of punishment.”262 
How do the realist and normative schools apply to U.S. ELEP?  The realist 
school undoubtedly helps us apprehend the descriptive picture of rising 
criminalization of foreign relations.263  But the normative school potentially 
arms us with tools to prescribe principled legislative reform. 
While a full exposition of such theories is beyond the scope of this Article, 
let us briefly consider two related theories of criminalization as examples of 
what this project might look like.264  First, one may focus on Professor Duff’s 
theory of crimes as moral wrongs that concern the public—all members of a 
given polity—by virtue of their shared membership.265  In his conception, a 
court may legitimately try a defendant if the alleged conduct is the proper 
concern of the political community to which the defendant belongs and, thus, 
the members to whom he must answer for violations of shared public 
values.266  Relatedly, Professor Kleinfeld asserts a reconstructivist account 
of criminal law, which serves a distinctive role by reconstructing the moral 
basis of its social order in the wake of an attack on its ethical life.267  From 
his viewpoint, crime is a communicative attack on social solidarity, and 
prosecution is normative reconstruction.268  Professor Duff and Kleinfeld’s 
theories would thus encourage us not to ask whether punishment of foreign 
nationals for certain conduct serves retributive ends justifying punishment 
based on moral desert.269  Instead, their theories might encourage us to focus 
on the moral wrongs that have infringed upon the relevant political and moral 
community and thus whether the expressive value of the prosecution of such 
conduct themselves may repair the broken ethical life of such community. 
Therefore, the central question—whether in domestic, transnational, or 
international criminal law—would be identifying the relevant public to 
whom the defendant is answerable.  For instance, when the U.S. criminalizes 
and then prosecutes five Chinese hackers for computer hacking, economic 
espionage, and other offenses directed at U.S. corporations, the U.S. polity 
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presumably perceives this to be a wrong.  But Professors Duff and Kleinfeld 
potentially help us to better see that U.S. ELEP is communicative not just for 
the American public but for the Chinese public; after all, the reconstructivist 
would say that the focus of criminalization is ultimately on ordinary people, 
not on the person being punished.270 
In doing so, then, the criminalization of certain conduct may make a U.S. 
community whole but may at the same time infringe upon foreign policy and, 
thus, tear at foreign relations.  Prosecution is inherently alienating,271 
especially from a transnational perspective.  Most of the time, a foreign 
nation’s citizenry will identify with a fellow national whom the U.S. is 
prosecuting.  Given this identification, U.S. ELEP can express to the foreign 
nation an imperialist America weaponizing its criminal justice system for 
political ends.  For both Professors Duff and Kleinfeld, criminalization, 
prosecution, and punishment should be communicative, such as negating the 
message of the human conduct.272  In this sense, U.S. ELEP’s effect is the 
opposite of what Duff has argued for:  the prosecution appears not as a 
legitimate act of criminalization and prosecution by a political community, 
but instead as a hollow, instrumental demand that the individual be punished.  
Another way of phrasing this is from a Kleinfeldian perspective:  to say that 
the United States has a shared moral culture is one thing; it is much harder to 
find a shared moral culture globally.273  This is possibly why the Meng case 
unfolded the way it did.  From a U.S. political community’s perspective, 
defiance of U.S.-government-mandated sanctions represents a violation of 
our collective order, leading to indictment in the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of New York and subsequent steps to apprehend Meng in 
Canada.  And yet the communicative aspect of this prosecution broke down 
in China, leading to retaliatory Chinese government action.274 
Would this mean that the United States should not criminalize or prosecute 
certain extraterritorial conduct out of fear of being badly viewed abroad?  No.  
But what it does mean is that the architecture of legislation animating U.S. 
ELEP should be deliberately designed and then implemented.  If one believes 
that the “pathological politics” of criminal law are already impeding the 
democratic and thus reconstructivist aims of criminal justice domestically, 
then one must attend to the effects of the problematic communicative aspects 
of such prosecutions abroad. 
Thus, legislative de-escalation could mean that the U.S. political branches 
narrow the universe of extraterritorial offenses to the most serious human 
conduct, crimes that will likely not be as “lost in translation” when 
communicated globally.  For example, Congress has given tremendous 
guidance regarding the extraterritoriality of child pornography statutes, 
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which address inherently cross-border and cyber-related issues. Specifically, 
one of the statutes criminalizes individuals who are “outside the United 
States.”275  This legislation is proper, since it criminalizes conduct that is 
universally condemned; this legislation, therefore, minimizes the risk of 
foreign relations complications.  On August 9, 2018, South Korean national 
Jong Woo Son was indicted by a federal grand jury in the federal district 
court for the District of Columbia for operating the world’s largest darknet 
site for child sexual exploitation—with no foreign relations pushback.276  On 
the other hand, the broadly construed conspiracy to defraud the United States, 
as was charged in the Meng case, is more amorphous both substantively and 
as a mode of liability; it is more likely to be perceived as a posture of 
American protectionism. 
The political branches could also cabin the specific cases for which 
individuals may be extradited from abroad.  A modern innovation in 
extradition law has been a “dual criminality” requirement, wherein an 
offense is extraditable so long as it is criminally codified in both the United 
States and in a foreign country.277  The dual criminality standard is desirable 
because it allows criminal justice systems to stay aligned over time.  But such 
treaties also have a gravity threshold—typically one year of imprisonment—
necessary to trigger the extradition process.278  The gravity threshold could 
be increased to five or more years. 
But this is just a sketch of what a reimagined statutory framework would 
look like.  So much in this space turns on the underlying normative theory of 
criminalization and should be a focus of further research.  A harm-based 
conception of criminalization, for example, could lead not to an emphasis on 
the communicative aspects of an offense but instead on the harm perpetrated 
domestically regardless of the international communicative ramifications.  
Future research must develop such normative foundations and then apply 
them to U.S. ELEP. 
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CONCLUSION 
U.S. criminal justice today stretches beyond our borders and risks 
overcriminalizing our foreign relations.  The two forces driving 
criminalization at home—overzealous prosecutors and overinclusive 
legislators—are combining with overreaching presidential authority to 
propel U.S. law enforcement abroad.  This Article calls for a principled role 
for U.S. extraterritorial law enforcement policy, one that upholds its 
distinctiveness and expressivism compared to six other foreign policy 
modalities.  Presidential distancing and prosecutorial integration will help the 
president, DOJ, and individual attorneys uphold these comparative 
advantages, while a richer normative theory of criminalization may facilitate 
the necessary legislative de-escalation. 
